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GOD BLESS THE CHILD?: THE USE OF





S IMULTANEOUS developments in law and culture have focused at-
tention on the use of religion as a factor in child custody disputes and
adoption proceedings.' As presumptions such as the "tender years" doc-
trine2 have been abandoned, they have been replaced by a determination
of the best interests of the child, a more open-ended process that weighs
the home environments offered by parents competing for custody. The
continuing religious diversification of the United States and the rising
incidence of religiously mixed marriage make it more likely that parents
will have different attitudes toward religion. At the same time, height-
ened interest in the scope and effect of the religion clauses of the first
amendment leads to questions about the propriety of courts considering
religion in making custody and adoption decisions.
This Article assumes that the best interests test, whatever its defects, is
likely to continue in most states as the basic framework for resolving
child custody disputes and adoption proceedings.3 The Article will not
weigh the merits of a broad "best interests" test against alternatives that
offer more certainty.4 Instead, this Article will explore the constitutional
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. 1973, Ford-
ham; J.D. 1976, New York University; LL.M. 1983, Temple.
1. One of the earliest common-law cases in which a court determined custody of a
child by examining the likely effect on the welfare of the child, rather than simply af-
firming the right of the father to control the child's upbringing, turned largely on the
atheistic beliefs of the father, poet Percy Bysshe Shelley. See Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37
Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817).
2. The tender years doctrine is the "presumption that when the children were of
'tender years,' the mother, unless shown to be unfit, should be given preference over the
father in the award of custody." Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody
Disputes, 15 J. Fam. L. 423, 425 (1976-77).
3. Adoption proceedings are even more attuned to seeking the best interests of the
child because adoption, unlike divorce, was unknown at common law, and thus unbur-
dened with common-law precedent favoring paternal rights. See Huard, The Laws of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 743, 746 (1956).
4. There has been considerable debate in recent literature over whether a broad
"best interests" test is actually preferable to a set of rules which would offer greater cer-
tainty. See Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226 (Summer 1975) (seminal criticism of a broad
"best interests" test); see also Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477, 478 (1984) (arguing current best interests
standard is both "too broad and too narrow to be acceptable," and suggesting legisla-
tively created formal preference for primary caretakers instead); Elster, Solomonic Judg-
ments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 11-28 (1987) (best
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
questions raised by the use of religion as a factor in these cases. May
courts consider the presence of a religious environment in the home of a
parent or prospective parent to be a positive factor without violating the
first amendment prohibition of establishment of religion? To what extent
may courts, at the request of a custodial parent, limit the religious activ-
ity of a non-custodial parent during visitation periods without compro-
mising the first amendment's guarantee of free exercise? Are "matching
statutes," under which some states attempt to place adopted children in
homes having the same religious environment as that of the biological
parents, constitutional? This Article considers such questions in light of
both the jurisprudence of the religion clauses and the findings of social
science concerning the relationship between religion and the welfare of
individuals and society.
Parts I and II of this Article briefly explore the current state of the law
of child custody and adoption and the current state of religion clause
jurisprudence. Part III reviews the ways in which these two fields inter-
sect. Part IV addresses whether the use of religion in these determina-
tions can be justified by secular considerations, as required by the
Constitution. Part V offers some conclusions on the constitutionality of
current statutes and state court practices. This Article concludes that
religion, defined in broad, non-traditional terms, is a permissible element
in child custody and adoption proceedings.
It should be noted that the constitutional analyses required in custody
disputes and adoption proceedings are very similar; in many instances,
the considerations are identical. This Article will, therefore, analyze the
constitutionality of the use of religion in custody disputes and then sup-
plement the analysis with unique concerns raised by adoption
proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Law of Child Custody
The principle that child custody disputes should be resolved by a de-
termination of the best interests of the child, and the related principle
that such a determination is best made by careful examination of facts on
a case-by-case basis, although now commonplace, are not ancient rules.
At common law, the father's rights as head of the household included
recognition as the "natural guardian of his child."5 The mother, as a
interest of child should not be sole, main, or first and paramount consideration in child
custody decisions); Fineman & Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymak-
ing: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 107, 121 (best interest test is
difficult to apply but should not "be discarded or interpreted out of existence").
5. Einhorn, Child Custody in Historical Perspective: A Study of Changing Social Per-
ceptions of Divorce and Child Custody in Anglo-American Law, 4 Behav. Sci. & L. 119,
123 (1986) (quoting 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 511 (1973)). The rights
of the "natural guardian" included choice of religion for the child. See Foster & Freed,
Life with Father, 11 Fain. L.Q. 321, 322 (1978).
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married woman, was considered a mere agent or ward of her husband,
rather than an individual with rights of her own.' Although within a
particular family a husband might give his wife power over the children,
the law regarded the married woman as the equivalent of an infant.
The rule that guardianship was a right of the father arose in a society
in which divorce was rare and available in practice only to the privi-
leged.7 Disputes over control of children rarely resembled a twentieth-
century custody dispute. Some custody questions, however, did arise.
For example, who was to control the children and their inheritances
upon their father's death? The answer was not always the mother. The
court might find that the interests of the father's estate were better pro-
tected by awarding guardianship to another relative.' The rule of pater-
nal rights was in place when Anglo-American society moved, during the
nineteenth century, closer to a permissive stance toward divorce.9
From the early nineteenth century to the early twentieth century,
American custody law underwent significant change.10 The rule that the
father's right to custody was not absolute, but could be lost through some
showing of unfitness, found its way into the law of most states. 1I
Although the law retained a paternal preference, it sometimes could be
overridden by the welfare of the child. Unfitness frequently was based on
finding fault with the father's past and present behavior, rather than at-
tempting to predict the child's future environment. Custody was often
primarily a reward to the party not at fault in the divorce. 12
In the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth, almost all
6. See Einhorn, supra note 5, at 120-23.
7. Until well into the nineteenth century, divorce could be obtained in England and
some American states only through a private bill of the legislature. See L. Friedman, A
History of American Law 179-84 (1973); see also Einhorn, supra note 5, at 124 (in Eng-
land, expensive appeal to Parliament through private bill required to be legally free to
remarry). Einhor quotes Holdsworth's quotation of a judicial pronouncement to a poor
man convicted of bigamy, outlining the proceedings he should have taken to secure a bill
of divorce and ending with a flourish worthy of Voltaire: "It is quite true that these
proceedings would have cost you many hundreds of pounds, whereas you probably have
not as many pence. But the law knows no distinction between rich and poor." Id. at 124-
25 (quoting I W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 623-24 (1971)).
8. See Einhorn, supra note 5, at 123 (choice of guardian dependent on nature of
property inherited).
9. See Friedman, supra note 7, at 179-84; Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best In-
terest May Be Unconstitutional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 Creigh-
ton L. Rev. 25, 30-44 (1981).
10. "The conflicting assumptions of 'father's natural rights' and 'tender years' appear
to be running neck and neck toward the end of the nineteenth century.... [A]s late as
1899 legal textbooks recognized the father as the child's natural guardian.... ." Einhorn,
supra note 5, at 127.
11. Courts, at times, found that unfitness for guardianship could be based upon the
blameworthy conduct, usually adultery, that created grounds for the divorce. See id. at
126.
12. See id. at 125-26. Under a fault-based system, "given the [nineteenth century]
social convention that the wife filed for divorce, courts no doubt awarded custody to the
mother more frequently than to the father." Mnookin, supra note 4, at 234-35.
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courts moved swiftly from a rebuttable presumption in favor of paternal
custody toward a strong presumption of maternal custody. 13 Courts jus-
tified application of the tender years doctrine by citing its supposed rela-
tion to the best interests of the child, and by assuming that the mother
was, by virtue of her sex and maternal bond, uniquely able to provide the
love and nurturing essential to a young child.14 The presumption was
consistent with late nineteenth-century attitudes toward women, which
idealized their domestic role, but which did so by affirming unique femi-
nine traits that reinforced the wall between the domestic domain of wo-
men and the outside world, governed by men. Thus, while the law held
women unsuited for the professions 5 and while women's suffrage was an
issue of intense controversy, courts recognized that "[m]other love is a
dominant trait in even the weakest of women, and as a general thing,
surpasses the paternal affection for the common offspring, and moreover,
a child needs a mother's care even more than a father's."
1 6
Although some courts during the era of paternal preference spoke of
grounding the rule in the best interests of the child, the dominant justifi-
cation was the natural rights or authority of the father as head of the
household. 7 Conversely, while some courts during the era of the tender
years presumption spoke in terms of the mother's rights, the dominant
rationale was the perceived interests of the child.1 8 This shift of view-
point proved as significant as the shift in the results of custody and adop-
tion proceedings in bringing on the next stage in the evolution of rules
concerning custody.
If the maternal preference was explicitly grounded in the best interests
of the child rather than the right of the mother, then it could be defeated
by a showing that the superiority of maternal love, in the individual case
or in general, was not supported by facts. Over the last two decades, the
13. See Einhorn, supra note 5, at 128-30. This was particularly true where children
under eight were concerned. See id. The age of seven was the cut-off point of the pre-
sumption in the British statute of 1839 which served as a pattern for American legisla-
tures and courts. See Roth, supra note 2, at 429. As Roth points out, a presumption in
favor of the mother was often forged by courts rather than by the explicit direction of
legislation. See id. at 432-38. This maternal presumption where young children were
involved is the result of the tender years doctrine. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
14. See Einhorn, supra note 5, at 128-30.
15. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (permit-
ting a state to deny women the right to practice law because the "timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life"). This view lasted in some courts well into the twentieth century. See Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (state could prohibit women from working as bartend-
ers), overruled, 429 U.S. 210 (1976).
16. Freeland v. Freeland, 92 Wash. 482, 483, 159 P. 698, 699 (1916).
17. See Roth, supra note 2, at 425-28.
18. See id. at 425-38. While the welfare of the child was a consideration that might
dilute the rule of paternal rights, it was seen as the reason for recognizing a maternal
preference. Still, some courts did speak in terms of maternal rights. See Einhorn, supra
note 5, at 128-30.
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women's movement has made great strides in establishing the principle
that the presence of individual talents and qualities should be measured
directly, rather than assumed on the basis of gender. In short, society
and in particular the law should rely on specific facts rather than stereo-
types.19 At the same time, a proliferation of writing in psychology and
the social sciences has attempted to isolate specific characteristics condu-
cive to successful child rearing and to debunk the notion that these are
the inevitable, gender-based attributes of maternal love.2'
Starting in the 1970s, the best interests of the child emerged, not as a
rationale for use of the tender years doctrine, but as the dominant rule of
decision in custody cases. A number of states explicitly repudiated any
maternal preference;21 indeed, some question was raised as to the consti-
tutional validity of gender-based presumptions.22 The absence of a gen-
der-based presumption has made custody determinations less
predictable.23 The most obvious alternative to such presumptions, a rule
requiring individualized inquiry into the best interests of each child, on
its face satisfies the impulse to seek a system of perfect justice or utility,
but may be unworkable.24 In addition, the absence of specific standards
19. Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)(characteristics of female sex, including timidity and delicacy, render females unsuitable
for many occupations of civil life) and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948)
("The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as
their prerogatives.., does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the
sexes ... ."), overruled, 429 U.S. 210 (1976) with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)("classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives") and Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (invalidating stereotyped distinctions that were "rationalized by
an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage") and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("To give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over the members of the other, merely to accomplish
the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. .. ").
20. Social science findings concerning the question of whether women should be fa-
vored as custodians because they are women, or whether other traits, not invariably
linked to gender, better indicate the ability to provide for a child's needs are reviewed by
Professor Chambers. See Chambers, supra note 4, at 503-41.
21. See Foster & Freed, supra note 5, at 332-34, 343-63.
22. See Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 182-83, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (Fam. Ct.
1973) (de facto maternal preference violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amend-
ment). But see Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271 (Okla.) (statutory maternal preference
upheld), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 863 (1978). The constitutional question is further mud-
dled by the fact that a number of states have added Equal Rights Amendments to their
state constitutions, presumably making gender distinctions even more difficult to sustain.
See People ex rel. Irby v. Dubois, 41 Ill. App. 3d 609, 613-14, 354 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1976)
(maternal presumption abandoned in light of state ERA). But see Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d
994 (Utah 1975) (state ERA did not invalidate maternal preference).
23. Some commentators have found that the absence of gender based preferences
"raises fundamental questions of fairness.., and involves the use of the judicial process
in a way that is quite uncharacteristic of traditional adjudication." Mnookin, supra note
4, at 292; see also Elster, supra note 4, at 12-16 (unjust decisions likely to occur).
24. See Elster, supra note 4, at 11; Mnookin, supra note 4, at 262-63.
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will make the process seem arbitrary.25 Confidence that similar cases
will be treated similarly may be the fundamental element of a citizen's
sense of justice.
Another approach is to enact legislation to supply gender-neutral stan-
dards for determining the best interests of children. Statutes may direct
courts to examine the emotional ties between parent and child,26 the
physical and mental health of each parent,27 the capacity of each parent
to provide the child's material needs,2" the expressed preferences of the
child,29 or other factors.30 These attempts to specify guidelines, however,
still leave great leeway for discretion, especially in light of the failure of
these statutes to make clear the relative importance of each factor.31
Nevertheless, an explicit statement of proper factors for judicial consider-
ation says something about the community's view of the role of parents
which, even if misguided, provides a starting point for discussion and
criticism.
Discussion and criticism of a broad best interests test has been plenti-
ful. One approach has been to seek a single, gender-neutral standard to
substitute for the broad analysis of multiple factors. In their enormously
influential book, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,32 Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit stressed the importance of a sense of stability in a
child's upbringing. This has been taken to support a rule that would
create a strong presumption of custody in the "primary caretaker. 33
25. The more fact-specific a decision is, the less reliable is the assessment that any
particular case is truly similar to any other. At some point, the degree of individuation of
each decision gives the process a decidedly ad hoc character. See Mnookin, supra note 4,
at 253-56.
26. See, e.g., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402 (revised 1982) ("The court
shall consider all relevant factors including... (3) the interaction and interrelationship of
the child with his parent or parents . . .
27. Id. § 402(5).
28. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3)(c) (1968 & Supp. 1989) (requiring
court to consider, among other factors, "[tihe capacity.., to provide the child with food,
clothing, medical care... and other material needs").
29. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 40 § 602(a)(2) (revised 1989) (court shall consider all
relevant factors including "the wishes of the child as to his custodian").
30. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.375(2) (Supp. 1990) (including as factors "[t]he
child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; ... any history of abuse of any
individuals involved; ... [t]he intention of either parent to relocate his residence outside
the state; and... [w]hich parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and meaningful
contact with the other parent"). On the other hand, some statutes simply refer to the best
interests of the child in broad terms, leaving the details to be decided by the courts. See,
e.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.07(b) (1986) (in best interests analysis, courts are only
guided by parents' circumstances).
31. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.375 (Supp. 1990) (statute requires consideration of
all relevant factors without suggesting some factors may be more important than others);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(3)(c) (1968 & Supp. 1989) (statute doesn't specify rela-
tive weights for each factor).
32. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973).
33. In one case, the court set forth a preference for the "primary caretaker," and a list
of specific factors to determine which parent has that role. The list includes questions of
who plans and prepares meals, who cleans and purchases the child's clothes, who puts the
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Others have advocated a return to a presumption of maternal custody. 4
There has been serious consideration of the virtue of random assignment
of custody in cases in which neither party is unfit and the two cannot
agree.3
5
An alternative to the best interests inquiry has been the recent surge in
attention focused on joint custody arrangements. Within a remarkably
short time, more than half of the states have enacted legislation to per-
mit, encourage or compel joint custody.36 Joint custody arrangements
give both divorcing parents the right to participate in major decisions
affecting the child's upbringing. Some jurisdictions go further, providing
for the child to maintain a residence or "home" with each parent.37 In
its idealized form, joint custody avoids the problems inherent in custody
decisions by making such decisions unnecessary. While the parents'
marriage has ended, divorce has not changed their status as parents.
Joint custody has been scrutinized in legal and social science literature in
recent years. The initial enthusiasm, however, has waned somewhat. It
appears that joint custody may be desirable if the parents agree to it vol-
untarily and can be expected to carry out the agreement in a genuinely
tolerant, non-hostile way.38 In short, it may be valuable as an option, but
detrimental as a rule.
child to bed and wakes the child in the morning. See Garska v. McCoy, 167 W. Va. 59,
68-71, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362-64 (1981). However, some of these factors may not be good
indicators of the emotional closeness of parent and child. See Chambers, supra note 4, at
538.
34. See Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 335 (1982).
Klaff argues that movement away from the tender years presumption is an unwise regres-
sion that would elevate parents' interests over those of children. He also notes that
"'mother'... is an extremely accurate proxy for 'primary caregiving parent'." Id. at
369.
35. See J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, supra note 32, at 153. Mnookin is almost
certainly correct when he states that a random assignment or "coin toss" type of system
would be regarded as offensive by most people. See Mnookin, supra note 4, at 290-91.
But see Elster, supra note 4, at 40-43 (discussion of virtues of coin toss system).
36. "About thirty states now have joint custody laws...." Freed & Walker, Family
Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 Fam. L. Q. 417, 523 (1988). Almost every state
considered joint custody in a remarkably short period of time starting in the late 1970s.
See Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation
and its Implications for Women and Children, 12 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 539, 539 (1982).
Schulman and Pitt describe the significantly different types of statutes that exist, some
creating joint custody only as an option, others declaring some sort of preference for such
an arrangement. See id. at 545-70.
37. See Chambers, supra note 4, at 549-50. Joint physical custody, however, is found
only in about 2 percent of cases. See id. at 549 n.276 ("Joint physical custody is far less
common than joint legal custody.").
38. See Twiford, Joint Custody: A Blind Leap of Faith?, 4 Behav. Sci. & L. 157, 167
(1986). It appears that the families in which joint custody works well are not the norm.
See McKinnon & Wallerstein, Joint Custody and the Preschool Child, 4 Behav. Sci. & L.
169 (1986); see also Chambers, supra note 4, at 550-58 (reviewing the social science data
on joint custody through 1983).
1989]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
B. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
Before discussing the application of the religion clauses of the first
amendment to custody or adoption of children, this Article will outline
the approaches taken by courts faced with disputes involving religion
clause claims, some of the unresolved difficulties in the area and some
alternative approaches that have attracted attention. These alternatives
encourage less formal application of existing standards. Recent free exer-
cise clause cases also indicate movement away from a strict application of
existing standards to a less precise balancing of interests.
1. The Establishment Clause
The first clause of the first amendment that discusses religion provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion."39 The 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education4° is recognized
as the starting point of modern analysis of the establishment clause. In
Everson, a sharply divided court sustained a New Jersey statute that pro-
vided for the reimbursement of parents for the cost of transporting their
children to parochial schools. 41 All the justices agreed, however, that the
goal of the establishment clause was to maintain a strict separation be-
tween church and state. Justice Black, writing for the Court and describ-
ing the effect of the clause, quoted Jefferson's conception of the clause as
creating a "wall of separation between church and state."4 2 The paradox
of Everson is obvious. Although the "wall of separation" is described in
nearly absolute language, the Court ruled against the establishment
clause claim. The "wall" may be a stirring metaphor, but of questionable
39. U.S. Const. amend. I.
40. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. See id. at 17-18.
42. T. Jefferson, Reply to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in 8 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 (H.A. Washington ed. 1854).
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or insti-
tutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)) (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original). Justice Black, writing for the Court, found that the wall
had not been breached, but that the program merely acted to ensure that the same secular
services were available to all. "State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them." Id. at 18.
390 [Vol. 58
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value as a legal standard.43 Not until the 1960s did the Court attempt to
construct a specific test for establishment clause claims.
In Abington School District v. Schempp,4 the Court held that requiring
Bible reading as a devotional exercise in public schools was unconstitu-
tional because the practice did not satisfy a two-part test:
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Consti-
tution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.4 5
The two-part test was found inadequate to resolve the question presented
to the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, a 1971 case.46 Rhode Island enacted
a statute providing a 15 percent salary supplement to state-certified pri-
vate school teachers. In order to ensure that the program had a secular
"primary effect," the grants were limited to teachers of secular subjects
who used only secular materials.47 The program failed to satisfy the es-
tablishment clause because of the very steps the legislature had taken to
ensure compliance with the second part of the Schempp test.
The Court drew on Walz v. Tax Commission,a" which upheld state tax
exemptions for religious property and other property devoted to non-
profit or charitable purposes, to highlight the constitutional aversion to
"entanglement" of church and state.4 9 In Lemon, the Court found that,
however well-intentioned, any effort to ensure that state-subsidized
teachers did not inject religion into secular courses would require "com-
prehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance."5 The
three-part test enunciated in Lemon has become the standard by which
government programs facing challenge on establishment clause grounds
43. The Everson dissenters make this point in their disparagement of Justice Black's
wall as "[n]either so high nor so impregnable" as the wall intended by Jefferson. See id.
at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
44. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
45. Id. at 222. The Court, in citing Everson, stressed not the "wall of separation"
metaphor but the principle of "neutrality." Id. at 218-19.
46. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
47. Grants were restricted to teachers of subjects taught in public schools. Teachers
had to be state certified and, with the supplement included, a teacher's salary could not
exceed the maximum paid to public school teachers. See id. at 607-08. The case also
invalidated a similar Pennsylvania statute, which reimbursed schools' actual expenses for
instruction in mathematics, modem foreign languages, physical science and physical edu-
cation. See id. at 609-10, 625.
48. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
49. Taxation of church property might involve, noted the Court, assessment of the
property, resolution of the question of what activities were purely religious and which
were charitable but secular, and a possible foreclosure proceeding against church prop-
erty in case of nonpayment. See id. at 672-74. In upholding the tax exemption, the court
noted that there is room for such benevolent neutrality between church and state. See id.
at 669.
50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
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are measured. To avoid violation of the clause, the government action
must (a) "have a secular legislative purpose"; (b) have a "principal or
primary effect... that neither advances nor inhibits religion";5" and (c)
avoid "an excessive ... entanglement with religion." 52
2. The Free Exercise Clause
The other first amendment religion provision commands that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." 5
In an eighteenth-century environment of limited government activity, the
mandate of this clause might seem entirely consistent with that of the
establishment clause. But in a modern, activist state, the invocation of
the free exercise clause to claim exemption from general rules of law will
inevitably highlight the tension between it and the establishment clause.
Can free exercise compel privileged treatment of religious believers and
how, if at all, is that different from the benefits to religion prohibited by
the establishment clause?54
Until the 1960s, there was little need to dwell on the tension between
the religion clauses, because there was very little independent force to the
free exercise clause. Cases rejecting Mormon claims of constitutionally-
compelled exemption from anti-polygamy laws established the principle
that the clause protected only belief and expression of belief, and not
"actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order."'55 This distinction between protected beliefs or expressions of be-
lief and unprotected actions motivated by belief 6 made the free exercise
clause largely a restatement, in religious terms, of the free speech clause.
When religiously-motivated parties successfully claimed constitutional
exemption from statutes of general application, they prevailed on
grounds that could be supported by the speech clause alone. 7
51. Id. at 612-13.
52. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
53. U.S. Const. amend. I.
54. See, e.g., Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (Connecticut statute giv-
ing employees absolute right to refuse employer's demands to work on employees'
Sabbath violated establishment clause, despite state's argument that it was an accommo-
dation of employees' free exercise rights); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270, 276
(1981) (state university must allow religious student groups equal access to campus facili-
ties, despite university's claim that such access would violate establishment clause).
55. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
56. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law, and reaffirmed the distinction between imper-
missible state regulation of belief and purely religious practices and permissible state
regulation of "secular activity." Id. at 605-06.
57. Several cases involved Jehovah's Witnesses. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940), the Court overturned a breach of the peace conviction against proselytizing
Witnesses in the absence of evidence of a "clear and present menace to public peace and
order." Id. at 311. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), the Court struck down a requirement that all children, including Jehovah's Wit-
nesses who objected on religious grounds, recite the pledge of allegiance at the start of the
school day. See id. at 642. But see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943)
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In 1963, however, the Court extended the protection of the free exer-
cise clause beyond belief and expression to action. 8 It held unconstitu-
tional, as applied to a Sabbatarian, a state's requirement that a recipient
of unemployment benefits be willing to accept jobs requiring Saturday
work to be eligible for compensation. 9 The Court found that when a
statute caused "substantial" interference with the practice of religion, the
state had to show that universal application of the statute was necessary
to protect a "compelling state interest."'6
It might be argued that a Saturday work requirement was constitution-
ally flawed only because it did not burden Sunday worshippers as well.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,61 however, the Court found that a neutral statute
was subject to the new free exeicise clause test. Members of the Old
Order Amish challenged a Wisconsin requirement that all children at-
tend school until they reach the age of sixteen. Because Old Order
Amish believe "that salvation requires life in a church community sepa-
rate and apart from the world and worldly influence,"'62 they reject for-
mal education beyond the eighth grade. They argued that such
education would teach values inconsistent with the Amish faith and re-
move children from their community during "the crucial and formative
adolescent period."63
Applying the strict scrutiny test, the Court found that the requirement
of high school attendance was a substantial burden on Amish religious
practice."4 History, found the Court, had demonstrated the effectiveness
of the Amish approach to education in preparing its adolescents for
adulthood within the Amish community. Because preparation for effec-
tive adult roles is the asserted state interest in compulsory education, the
Court held that Wisconsin could not justify insistence upon its type of
education over another that had also proven itself. 5 The Court also
found that the state had failed to establish a compelling interest in requir-
ing one or two years of education beyond eighth grade for Amish
children.
(striking down tax on distribution of religious literature, giving religious literature pre-
ferred position, other literature being taxable despite first amendment speech and press
protections).
58. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
59. See id. at 410.
60. See id. at 403, 406-07.
61. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62. Id. at 210.
63. Id. at 211.
The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments,
self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other stu-
dents. Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of
"goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowl-
edge; community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather
than integration with, contemporary worldly society.
Id.
64. See id. at 217-18.
65. See id. at 221-25.
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Yoder was the high point of deference to free exercise clause claims.
As discussed below, the Supreme Court's recent free exercise decisions
seem to indicate a drift toward a balancing test that gives great weight to
articulated government interests. Still, the language of the Yoder test
remains. When claimants establish that a government practice substan-
tially burdens their practice of religion, government must demonstrate
that the practice is necessary to protect a compelling state interest.
3. The Articulated Religion Clause Tests-Problems and Alternatives
The presence of articulable tests for analysis of establishment clause
and free exercise clause cases has not prbduced predictability in religion
clause cases. Despite a barrage of criticism, the Supreme Court has stood
by the language of its prior opinions. 6 The Court's decisions, however,
indicate that some proposed alternatives may be having an effect.67 The
Lemon test has created a cottage industry in critical commentary.
Separationists find the test too loose in its acceptance of plausible secular
state purposes68 and too pliable in its quest for a primary secular effect.69
Accommodationists point to the "Catch-22" nature of the entanglement
clause as an obstacle to conscientious legislative attempts to satisfy the
"effects" test.7° The Court itself has indicated discomfort with the
66. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581-85 (1987) (commencing its analysis
of statute requiring schools to teach "creation science' by reciting Lemon criteria); Hob-
bie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (Court cited extensively to
Sherbert and Yoder in analyzing free exercise claim factually similar to Sherbert).
67. The following is a list of the more prominent suggested alternatives to Lemon: (i)
a test that makes the presence or absence of coercion determinative, see McConnell, Coer-
cion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933, 940 (1986) (sug-
gesting that Court's three-part test be modified to forbid government action that coerces
religious belief and behavior); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3135 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (finding a creche display in violation of establish-
ment clause "border[s] on latent hostility toward religion . . . ."); (ii) a test in which the
core question is whether a statute or practice explicitly singles out religion for special
treatment, see Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 96 (1961) (democratic society cannot survive without equality and certainty as funda-
mental objectives in our legal system); (iii) a test that uses a broad balancing approach,
see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development-Part II:
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 513-16 (1968) (suggesting "refine-
ment" of existing tests in pursuance of "political neutrality"); and (iv) Professor Choper's
two-part test that would uphold a government practice unless it lacks a legitimate secular
purpose and (rather than or, as in Lemon) is likely to compromise, coerce or influence
religious beliefs. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 675 (1980) (suggesting same principle should be used
to resolve establishment and free exercise clause conflicts). As intriguing as these sugges-
tions are, with the possible exception of coercion, now endorsed by Justice Kennedy, they
show little sign of displacing Lemon.
68. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 Duke L.J. 770, 784.
69. See id. Generally, the Supreme Court has been far more likely to find the absence
of a primary secular effect than the absence of a secular purpose. See L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 14-10, at 1214-1216 (2d ed. 1988).
70. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jus-
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Lemon framework, hinting that it is only a tool for analysis, not an inva-
riable rule.7 1 Such language tends to appear in those cases where the
outcome seems most clearly in conflict with what Lemon would com-
mand.72 Yet the test survives, perhaps more out of dissatisfaction or dis-
agreement about alternatives than positive enthusiasm for it.73
While not renouncing Lemon, Justice O'Connor has recently sug-
gested a clarification of establishment clause analysis.74 In her view, the
establishment clause prohibits two types of government actions. "One is
excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere
with the independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of
the religion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined
along religious lines."' 75 This adds little to Lemon's insights. The second
goal, which has attracted much more attention, is to prohibit "govern-
ment endorsement or disapproval of religion."76 Justice O'Connor's fo-
cus is on the message communicated by the government action in
question and whether the action is likely to make nonadherents of reli-
gious doctrine reasonably feel disfavored because of their views and ex-
cluded from what they perceive to be a religiously committed
community.77 While this test has been criticized,78 many have welcomed
it as a promising alternative to Lemon.79
tice O'Connor has also criticized the use of "non-entanglement" as a separate require-
ment. See id. at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
394 (1983).
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 795 (1983) (Court upheld use of paid legislative chaplains by Nebraska legislature
without any overt reference to Lemon test).
73. Justice Powell endorses the test as "the only coherent test a majority of the Court
has ever adopted." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
74. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Jaffree, 472
U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (government may consider religion when mak-
ing law and policy, but is precluded from favoring one particular religion).
75. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88.
76. See id. at 688.
77. See id. "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message." Id. Professor Suzanna Sherry sees this "strikingly unique vision
of the harms that the establishment clause is intended to prevent," this concern with the
importance of a sense of belonging to the community, as a distinctly feminine perspective.
See Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L.
Rev. 543, 593-595 (1986).
78. See Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266, 269 (1987).
79. See, e.g., Dellinger, The Sound of Silence: An Epistle on Prayer and the Constitu-
tion, 95 Yale L.J. 1631, 1638 (1986) (applying Justice O'Connor's "promising approach"
to conclude that moment of silence law does not constitute legislative endorsement of
religion); Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Estab-
lishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. Rev.
1049, 1051 (1986) (commending Justice O'Connor's endorsement test and arguing that
"its serious implementation will require rethinking some of our most firmly entrenched
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Similarly, the free exercise clause test has been criticized and alterna-
tives have been suggested. 0 Several recent decisions of the Supreme
Court are difficult to reconcile with the strict scrutiny approach of Yoder.
In the Court's willingness to accept some matters of arguable gravity l as
compelling interests, and in its failure to insist on the use of less restric-
tive alternatives, 2 the Court may well be using a flexible balancing ap-
proach under the guise of strict scrutiny. This is potentially dangerous,
however, because such balancing almost surely calls for an assessment of
the importance to claimants of various religious practices.8 3 Such assess-
ments evoke images of courts assigning values to thoughts and acts that
they have no business either promoting or belittling.
II. RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN CHILD CUSTODY AND ADOPTION:
CURRENT LAW
The use of religion as a factor in child custody disputes is as old as the
best interests test itself. The case generally cited as the leading English
precedent supporting the proposition that the presumption of paternal
custody could be overridden by evidence of unfitness used atheism as
proof of that unfitness.8 4 In the United States, child custody and adop-
tion proceedings are a matter of state law. A survey of current law in the
practices"); Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-
Scientific Sieve, 36 Hastings L.J. 155, 162 (1984) ("Justice O'Connor at least asked the
right question in Lynch."); Note, Permissible Accommodations of Religion: Reconsidering
the New York Get Statute, 96 Yale L.J. 1147, 1160 (1987) (Justice O'Connor's approach
"provides a standard capable of consistent application and avoids the criticism levelled
against the Lemon test.").
80. See generally Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an
Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 943, 948 (1986) (suggesting
establishment clause analysis be applied to free exercise clause); Giannella, Religious Lib-
erty, NonEstablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part L: The Religious Liberty Guar-
antee, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1386 (1967) (Court must adopt uniform concept of what is
"religious" to ensure consistency in religion clause cases); Marshall, Solving the Free Ex-
ercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 545, 593-94 (1983) (equal
treatment for expression of religious interests and free speech claims would eradicate
establishment clause problems with free exercise clause test).
81. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (state interest in maintain-
ing completely standardized military uniforms); Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981) (state interest in confining fund solicita-
tion activities at state fair to fixed locations).
82. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,
350 (1987) (prison work schedules need not accommodate Muslim prisoners who want to
attend weekly religious services); Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10 (giving wide deference to
decisions of military in establishing dress code).
83. In theory, courts are to avoid assigning their own values to religious practices, or
the burdens placed on them. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
Clearly, however, such judicial evaluations do take place. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 725, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76, 394 P.2d 813, 820 (1964) ("Polygamy, although a basic
tenet in the theology of Mormonism, is not essential to the practice of the religion; pe-
yote, on the other hand, is the sine qua non of defendants' faith.").
84. See Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850, 851 (Ch. 1817) (atheism of father
used as evidence of unfitness).
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United States is facilitated by dividing the subject matter into several
discrete questions.
A. May Religion Be Considered in Determining the
Best Interests of the Child?
Only a few state statutes specify the factors to be considered as part of
best interests determinations. Most of the states that do specify factors
include permission to consider other factors." As a result, the determi-
nation of the factors constituting best interests is usually a task for the
courts. There is consensus among courts that "moral" factors are proper
considerations, 6 and many courts also have explicitly endorsed consider-
ation of the child's "spiritual" welfare.8 7 In broad terms, then, religion is
considered to be a proper subject of inquiry in custody disputes.
A number of states, however, have taken steps to limit the role of reli-
gion. For example, some courts say that religion may not be the sole or
dominant factor in the determination. 8 Such statements, however, have
raised as many questions as they have answered. If the statement means
that religious factors may never outweigh more tangible factors, then ap-
parently religion can be used only to bolster the same decision that would
have been made without its consideration and would never tip the bal-
85. See Wyer, Gaylord & Grove, The Legal Context of Child Custody Evaluations, in
Psychology and Child Custody Determinations 3, 10-14 (L. Weithorn ed. 1987); supra
notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 353, 157 A.2d 442, 446 (1960) (listing factors
to be considered in best interests analysis); In re Adoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36, 49, 279
A.2d 785, 792 (1971) (trial court should have considered moral factors when deciding
best interests of child). Some statutes specifically refer to the moral fitness of the parents
as a proper concern. See, ag., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3109.04 (B)(1)(c) (Anderson 1989)
(modification of custody appropriate where "present environment endangers significantly
... moral ... development"); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(1) (1989) ("demonstrated moral
standards"). But family law in general has recently become more reluctant to address
issues in moral terms. See Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of Ameri-
can Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1806 (1985).
87. See, e.g., Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498, 502, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 (1981)
(court considers "not only the spiritual and temporal welfare" of child, but other factors
as well); Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 484-85, 232 S.E.2d 470, 471-72 (1977) (court's
determination that parent's failure to take child to Sunday school affected child's spiritual
welfare did not violate constitutional separation of church and state); Pruss v. Pruss, 236
Pa. Super. 247, 249, 344 A.2d 509, 510 (1975) ("[t]he best interests of [a child] are not
limited to physical well-being, but include moral, intellectual, and spiritual welfare") (em-
phasis added). Two states specifically refer to "spiritual" interests in statutes. See Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 571-46(5) (1985) (court may hear testimony relevant to a "determination of
what is for the best physical, mental, moral, and spiritual well-being of the child"); S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-3-160 (1976) (court may make "such orders touching . . . what ...
security shall be given for... the best spiritual as well as other interests of the children").
88. See, eg., Frank v. Frank, 26 Ill. App. 2d 16, 20, 167 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1960)
(religion is significant but not exclusive factor in custody determinations); Anhalt v. Fes-
ler, 6 Kan. App. 2d 921, 923, 636 P.2d 224, 226 (1981) (religion alone is not sufficient
when considering best interests of children); Commonwealth ex rel. English v. English,




ance one way or the other.8 9 Such an interpretation would make religion
irrelevant. On the other hand, if the statement means only that some
secular interests, in addition to religious interests, must support a cus-
tody award,90 then it is scarcely a limitation on courts at all.
Other courts apply the more substantial limitation that religion may be
considered only to the extent that it will have a clear bearing on the
secular well-being of the child.9" Thus, legitimate arguments might be
made that religion or its absence will cause physical, emotional or social
benefits or harm to the child.92 Arguments resting on spiritual welfare
alone, or labeling religion as per se beneficial are disallowed.93 This rule
may be applied with different levels of rigor. On the one hand, it may be
said to preclude consideration of anything short of clear evidence of ac-
tual, evident harm.94 On the other, it may permit prediction of secular
effects as more or less likely.95 In Zucco v. Garrett,96 an Illinois court
flatly stated that it was improper "to conclude that providing a religious
environment is per se beneficial to a child's welfare. We believe ... that
the intrinsic benefits, if any, of an 'upbringing in religion' are beyond the
89. See Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1029 (Me. 1980). A court should initially
assess best interests without giving consideration to either parent's religious practices. A
court should then go on to consider the impact of religion only where the practices of the
parent preferred by the initial inquiry pose "an immediate and substantial threat to the
child's well-being." Id. at 1031.
90. Except in clear cases such as child abuse, some secular argument can be made in
support of either parent. For example, while the mother may be the primary caretaker,
the father will normally have higher earnings at the time of divorce. See Chambers, supra
note 4, at 527-41. This is somewhat analogous to the case which usually satisfies the
"purpose" prong of the Lemon test. Except for extreme cases, some credible secular
motive can be pointed to for almost all legislation. See L. Tribe, supra note 69, § 14-9, at
1204-06 (2d ed. 1988).
91. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1311-12 (Colo. 1985) (court's
neutrality on issue of parent's religion does not preclude it from hearing evidence of par-
ent's religious practice that may cause physical or emotional harm to child); Osier, 410
A.2d at 1032 (in custody determination mother's religious practices should be considered
only as they relate to child's well-being); In re Marriage of Hadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566,
579, 619 P.2d 374, 382 (1980) ("religious decisions and acts may be considered in a cus-
tody decision only to the extent that [they] will jeopardize the temporal mental health or
physical safety of the child").
92. See Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498, 502, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 (1981).
93. See Gould v. Gould, 116 Wis. 2d 493, 503, 342 N.W.2d 426, 432 (1984).
94. In Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), evidence that the
custodial mother was a member of a sect that taught strict separation between members
and non-members and that would regard the child's father, a non-member, as "unclean"
was held insufficient to determine a custody award. See id. at 516. "Although the evi-
dence indicates a probability of psychological impact," the court would not act in the
absence of an actual showing of harm. Id. at 518.
95. In Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498, 304 N.W.2d 58 (1981), the court was
willing to act on its view that the mother's adherence to the teachings of an ultra-con-
servative Catholic sect, which would require her to shun her daughter if she disobeyed
church rules and teach racist views, would be likely to cause harm to the child. See id. at
503, 304 N.W.2d at 61-62.
96. 150 Ill. App. 3d 146, 501 N.E.2d 875 (1986).
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power of a civil court to comprehend."'97 But a New York court, also
purporting to focus on the secular welfare of the child, stated in Robert
0. v. Judy E.98 that "[r]eligion and morality are so closely interwoven in
the lives of most people that it is difficult to say whether good moral
character could be molded in a child without some religious training."99
The test of secular well-being, then, may be interpreted in ways that seri-
ously limit consideration of religion, or ways that hardly limit it at all.
A final significant distinction made by some courts is between children
with "actual religious needs" and those without such needs. Under this
view, a court determines whether the child has acquired religious prefer-
ences and whether a particular religion is part of the child's identity. If
so, the relative ability of parents to tend to those needs is a proper consid-
eration.1"o If not, then religion is irrelevant. This position also requires
some elaboration. Does only a mature child have actual religious needs,
or do they exist from the earliest stages of religious training?" 1 Some
courts have focused on the expressed wishes of the child, 102 others on the
value of stability in all phases of the child's life.103 How much weight is
to be assigned to actual religious needs? One commentator has con-
cluded that these preferences should be given no more weight than a
child's preferences in other areas, even if the child is mature."° Is this so
97. Id. at 155, 501 N.E.2d at 880 (emphasis in original).
The principle or primary effects of giving preference to parents who are active
adherents of organized religion will be (1) to punish parents who do not believe
in God or going to church... (2) to encourage non-religious, anti-religious, or
simply disinterested parents to engage in religious practices even if their beliefs
are not sincere, and (3) to increase the number of children raised in religious
households.
Id. at 155-56, 501 N.E.2d at 881 (citation omitted).
98. 90 Misc. 2d 439, 395 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977).
99. Id. at 441, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
100. See Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1239-40 (Alaska 1979); In re Vardinakis,
160 Misc. 13, 17-18, 289 N.Y.S. 355, 361 (N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. Ch. 1936); see also Note,
The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion
into the Best Interest Equation, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1702, 1727-32, 1738 (1984) (distinction
is put forward as important in resolving the constitutional problem).
101. See Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceed-
ings, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 649 (1959). Some courts have discounted the religious prefer-
ences of younger children. See, eg., Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 48 N.J. Super. 349,
354, 137 A.2d 618, 621 (N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. 1958) (seven year-old too immature to
choose religion); Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 88 Misc. 2d 866, 874, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993,
999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (10 year-old too young to suffer imposition of choice of reli-
gion); Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810, 815, 489 P.2d 1133, 1136 (1971) (en banc) (six
year-old too young to choose religion).
102. See Bonjour, 592 P.2d at 1240; Vardinakis, 160 Misc. at 18, 289 N.Y.S. at 361.
103. In Robert 0. v. Judy E., 90 Misc. 2d 439, 395 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1977), the court, although recognizing that the nine year-old child would not be able to
"choose for himself" until some time in the future, recognized the value of "allowing him
the opportunity to continue in those religious services [to which] he has been introduced."
Id. at 441-42, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (emphasis in original).
104. "The first amendment's requirement of governmental neutrality toward religion
will only be satisfied if courts treat religion-based preferences as they treat preferences
based on other relevant considerations." Note, supra note 100, at 1729 n.97.
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in light of the free exercise clause, which presumably also protects ma-
ture minors? °5
B. May Courts Weigh the Merits of Different Religions?
The religious issue often arises in custody disputes in which both par-
ents intend to give the child religious training, but where each adheres to
a different religion. As the incidence of both divorce and interreligious
marriage increases, such situations become more common. 106 The issue
then becomes one of weighing the relative value of two self-described
religions. 10
7
The general rule in these cases is easy to state. If there is an undis-
puted core to the religion clauses it is that government may not prefer
one religion to another;10 8 courts uniformly refuse to weigh the relative
merits of religions.109 Occasionally, however, courts find that a religion,
almost always a highly unconventional sect,110 poses a clear threat to a
105. There are some instances in which courts recognize a minor's constitutional rights
even when they conflict with rights of parental choice. See Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). On the subject of the relationship between parents, chil-
dren and state power, see Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329.
On the specific subject of minors and free exercise, see Note, Adjudicating What Yoder
Left Unresolved: Religious Rights for Minor Children After Danforth and Carey, 126 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1135 (1978).
106. Although most American marriages are religiously homogeneous, the incidence
of interfaith marriage appears to be increasing. The percentage of religiously heterogene-
ous marriage is substantially higher among younger couples. See Alston, McIntosh &
Wright, Extent of Interfaith Marriages Among White Americans, 37 Soc. Analysis 261,
262-63 (1976). This is tempered by the fact that over time, most couples from different
religions "eventually achieve ... religious unity" through conversion of one or both
spouses. See R. Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion 90 (1988). Yet
"[f]or every major denomination, a smaller proportion of married people are currently
wedded to a spouse who has the same religion as theirs than was the case a few decades
ago." Id.
107. The case law simply avoids the problem of defining religion, see infra notes 168-
182 and accompanying text, by accepting conventional concepts of what a religion is and
taking the parties' own classification of their beliefs at face value. All of the cases dis-
cussed in this analysis of whether courts may weigh the merits of different religions in-
volve parents who adhere to groups that call themselves religious and that clearly fit that
description in conventional usage.
108. Even the most cautious application of the establishment clause would require ap-
plication of this principle. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (establishment clause designed to prevent government preference of one reli-
gious denomination or sect over others).
109. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 278, 278, 132 A.2d 420,
422 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957) (court rejected claim that children's welfare would improve
with a change of custody and exposure to father's religion); Compton v. Gilmore, 98
Idaho 190, 195, 560 P.2d 861, 866 (1977) (court reversed part of order prohibiting father
from providing religious training to his daughter); Goodman v. Goodman, 180 Neb. 83,
88-89, 141 N.W.2d 445, 448-49 (1966) (custodial parent's religious beliefs do not warrant
change in custody absent showing of serious threat to child's health or well-being);
Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810, 815-16, 489 P.2d 1133, 1136 (1971) (en banc) (re-
versing order prohibiting father from taking children to church).
110. One way to avoid the need to choose between religions would be to define a sect as
something other than a religion, a route taken in other contexts involving some first
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child's well being and decide a custody dispute on that basis. In Burn-
ham v. Burnham, 1 the Nebraska Supreme Court found that a mother's
adherence to the views of an ultra-conservative sect endangered the wel-
fare of her daughter. Specifically, the mother believed that her daughter
was illegitimate in the eyes of the church, that if her daughter disobeyed
church rules she would be required to shun her and that, according to
church teaching, "'there exists in this world, a master plot on the part of
the Jews and Communists, to gain control of the world.' "112
Burnham is unusual. Other courts on similar facts have tenaciously
held to the principle of refusing to declare some religious beliefs inferior
to others. In Quiner v. Quiner,113 a California court rejected the conten-
tion that a mother's adherence to the beliefs of a sect that prohibited
social contact with non-members, participation in civic or political activ-
ity, ownership of radios or televisions and giving toys to children was
necessarily contrary to the child's best interests.11 4 The court declared
that it would act only upon concrete evidence of actual impairment of the
child's well being.1 15
C. May Courts Determine Which Parent Will Provide a Better
Religious Upbringing, Regardless of Denomination?
Religion may be a factor in custody cases even in the absence of a
denominational split between parents. In such cases, courts have often
attempted to determine which parent would provide the better religious
atmosphere for the child. Evidence taken into account has ranged from
relatively objective matters, such as only one parent living in a commu-
nity that had religious facilities for the children to attend,1 6 to more
amendment claims. See generally Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031-34 (3d
Cir. 1981) (prisoner failed to show MOVE was protected as religion within first amend-
ment because he could not show beliefs were sincere and religious in nature, rather than
self-serving), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982).
111. 208 Neb. 498, 304 N.W.2d 58 (1981).
112. Id. at 500, 304 N.W.2d at 60 (quoting letter written by defendant to her sister-in-
law).
113. 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
114. The court enumerated the stern requirements of church membership. See id. at
508-09. Also significant was the fact that the mother would teach the child that the
father, as a non-adherent to the faith, was "unclean." Id. at 513.
115. The court stated the following:
Although the evidence indicates a probability of psychological impact, we
doubt that we can.., anticipate on the basis of psychiatric conclusion alone
that a child's attitude toward his father will assume an inimicable or hostile
complexion, or that his physical, emotional or mental health will be af-
fected.... [I]f... it be shown that [the child's] physical, emotional and mental
well-being has been affected and jeopardized ... the courts of our state [will
provide] ready access for relief.
Id. at 518.
116. See T. v. H., 102 N.J. Super. 38, 39, 245 A.2d 221, 221 (N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. 1968)
(father lived in community near Jewish temples and Hebrew schools; mother, also Jew-
ish, moved to town 80 miles from nearest temple), aff'd, 110 N.J. Super. 8, 264 A.2d 244
(N.J. Super. Ct., A.D. 1970).
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subjective matters, such as the moral conduct of the parties. The Iowa
Supreme Court, in McNamara v. McNamara,1 7 in awarding custody to
the father, emphasized the importance of its finding that he "conscien-
tiously adheres to religious teachings and would apparently rear his chil-
dren in the same manner.'"1 8 Even though the court found that "both
parents [were] about equally capable of caring for the children," the
mother's adulterous behavior presumably tipped the scales in favor of
paternal custody.1 19
Courts occasionally comment with favor on regular church attend-
ance, 12 parental participation in church-related activities 21 and on their
intentions that the children attend services, Sunday school or parochial
school.122 It should be noted, however, that more religious activity has
not always been found to be better. In Hilley v. Hilley,123 the Alabama
Supreme Court held that a trial judge could consider evidence that the
intense church involvement of an evangelist was having an adverse effect
on her children.124
Extreme cases aside, courts have often attempted to resolve the ques-
tion of which parent would provide a better religious environment, re-
gardless of the parents' denominational differences. Courts have
considered church attendance, involvement in church activities and a
lifestyle consistent with church teachings.
117. 181 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1970).
118. Id. at 209.
119. See id. at 209-10.
120. See, e.g., Strickland v. Strickland, 285 Ala. 693, 695, 235 So. 2d 833, 835 (1970)
(father attending church with son demonstrates father is excellent parent); Lewis v.
Lewis, 217 Kan. 366, 370-71, 537 P.2d 204, 208 (1975) (father's church membership and
taking children to church indicates children are well cared for); Welch v. Welch, 307 So.
2d 737, 739 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (father's taking children to church implies his fondness
for them).
121. See, e.g., Meyer v. Hackler, 219 La. 750, 753, 54 So. 2d 7, 10 (1951) ("the evi-
dence preponderates that [the mother] bears an excellent reputation for morals, being a
devoted worker in the church"); In re Custody of King, 11 N.C. App. 418, 419, 181
S.E.2d 221, 221 (1971) (mother's church participation is factor in mother's ability to care
for child).
122. See, eg., Woodard v. Woodard, 46 Ala. App. 507, 509, 244 So. 2d 595, 597 (1971)
(father's insistence that children attend church favorable factor in custody determina-
tion); Johnson v. Johnson, 536 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (same). In several
cases, the courts approvingly commented that one parent maintained a "good Christian
home," or words to that effect. See, e.g., McCullough v. McCullough, 222 Ark. 390, 394,
260 S.W.2d 463, 465 (1953); Crowe v. Crowe, 116 Ind. App. 534, 541, 65 N.E.2d 645,
648 (1946); Hamm v. Hamm, 207 Kan. 431, 434, 485 P.2d 221, 224 (1971).
123. 405 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1981).
124. The mother, an evangelist, frequently took her children to church activities that
lasted until 11:00 p.m. "[T]he trial judge stated that he considered [the mother's] actions
... bordered upon abuse .. " Id. at 709. The Supreme Court of Alabama, while finding
the language of the trial court's opinion too restrictive, affirmed the trial court's consider-
ation of religion and its effect on the children. See id.
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D. May Courts Limit Religious Activity of Non-Custodial Parents
During Visitation Periods?
The custodial parent usually controls the child's religious education.125
A custody award generally provides the non-custodial parent with visita-
tion rights.126 Because visitation often places a child in the home of the
non-custodial parent on weekends and holidays, days with particular
religious significance, visitation conflicts over religion are not uncom-
mon. Usually, the custodial parent will complain either that the non-
custodial parent is improperly instructing the child in a religion inconsis-
tent with that of the custodial parent, or that the visitation interferes
with the child's participation in religious activity required by the religion
of the custodial parent.
The need to balance the rights of the custodial parent, the welfare of
the child and the rights of the non-custodial parent, not only to visitation
but also free exercise, has produced a number of highly fact-specific cases
that fail to produce clear rules, but do identify some tendencies. Courts
are more likely to interfere with non-custodial parents' involving chil-
dren in clearly defined religious activity than in the aspects of religion
which pervade everyday life. Thus, an Arizona court prohibited a non-
custodial parent from taking his child to Jewish religious training during
visitation periods against the custodial parent's objection,,27 but a New
York court refused to order a non-custodial father to permit telephone
access to his children during Sabbath visits, when the use of a telephone
would violate his Orthodox Jewish principles. 2 ' In Morris v. Morris,2 9
a Pennsylvania court prohibited a non-custodial father from taking his
child to Sunday meetings and on door-to-door religious solicitation, but
noted that it did not prohibit him from discussing his Jehovah's Witness
beliefs with the child. 130
A number of courts, however, have held that even religious services
and instruction will not be interfered with in the absence of a clear show-
ing that exposure to a different religion is harming the child.' 31 Some
125. See Note, The Religious Upbringing of Children After Divorce, 56 Notre Dame
Law. 160, 162 (1980).
126. See id. at 167. The exact nature of visitation is unclear. It has been argued that a
non-custodial parent has a right to some access to a child. See Novinson, Post-Divorce
Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 121, 121. But a number of
courts have recognized that visitation is controlled by the overriding principle of the best
interests of the child. See Henszey, Visitation by a Non-Custodial Parent: What Is the
"Best Interest" Doctrine?, 15 J. Fam. L. 213, 214 (1976). Under this view, visitation is
merely a privilege to the non-custodial parent. If there is a visitation right, it belongs to
the child. See Davidson & Gerach, Child Custody Disputes: The Child's Perspective, in
R. Horowitz & H. Davidson, Legal Rights of Children 232, 251-55 (1984).
127. See Funk v. Ossman, 150 Ariz. 578, 581-83, 724 P.2d 1247, 1250-51 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986).
128. See Kadin v. Kadin, 131 A.D.2d 437, 439, 515 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870 (1987).
129. 271 Pa. Super. 19, 412 A.2d 139 (1979).
130. See id. at 34-35, 412 A.2d at 147.
131. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 505, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79,
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courts insist on showings of anxiety, guilt or hostility toward the custo-
dial parent before the court will intervene.132 In Felton v. Felton,133 a
Massachusetts court suggested that, contrary to the assumption that con-
sistency is essential in religious education, exposure to different "religious
models" should be considered beneficial.1 34 Other courts, such as the
Morris court, assume that religious differences are necessarily confusing
and harmful to children. 135
Several courts have tailored or modified visitation rights to ensure that
the child would fulfill religious obligations imposed by the faith of the
custodial parent even when the child was with the non-custodial parent.
For example, courts have upheld requirements that non-custodial par-
ents transport children to weekend services or religious education
classes, 136 as well as those that require the child to be returned to the
custodial parent from visits for regular religious observances.1 37 But this
is not always the case, as some courts have held that such orders are not
clearly in the best interests of the child and are too great an intrusion into
the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent. 138
E. May the Religion of Prospective Parents Be a Factor in Adoption?
The question of religion presents itself in two principal ways in adop-
tion cases: the presence or absence of religious belief as evidence of the
suitability of prospective adoptive parents; and the use of "religious
matching," a system which favors placement of a child with adoptive
parents of the same faith.
The presence of religion in the home of a prospective adoptive parent
has been held to be a proper consideration in a broad inquiry into fitness
82 (1980) (non-custodial father can involve child in religious activities unless activities are
shown to harn child); Robertson v. Robertson, 19 Wash. App. 425, 427, 575 P.2d 1092,
1093 (1978) (factual showing of danger to child's welfare is required for court interfer-
ence with non-custodial parent's religious training of child). The same result was reached
in Robert O. v. Judy E., 90 Misc. 2d 439, 395 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977), where
the custodial mother objected to the father taking the child to religious services during
visitation, not because it conflicted with the mother's religious training, but because the
mother objected to any organized religion. See id. at 440-41, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
132. Compare Morris, 271 Pa. Super. at 25, 412 A.2d at 142 ("it is beyond dispute that
a young child reared into two inconsistent religious traditions will quite probably experi-
ence some deleterious physical or mental effects") with Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d
810, 815, 489 P.2d 1133, 1136 (1971) ("We are not convinced... absen[t] evidence to the
contrary, that duality of religious belief[ ] ... creates a conflict upon young minds. Be-
cause of their young ages, it is doubtful that the children in this case sufficiently under-
stand the religious teachings to be concerned about any conflicting beliefs.").
133. 383 Mass. 232, 418 N.E.2d 606 (1981).
134. See id. at 234-35, 418 N.E.2d at 607-08.
135. See Morris v. Morris, 271 Pa. Super. 19, 24-25, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (1979).
136. See Overman v. Overman, 497 N.E.2d 618, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Chapman v.
Chapman, 352 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
137. See Chasan v. Mintz, 119 N.H. 865, 866-68, 409 A.2d 787, 787-88 (1979).
138. See Angel v. Angel, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 136, 138, 140 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio Com. P1.
1956); Matthews v. Matthews, 273 S.C. 130, 133, 254 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1979).
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of a prospective parent and the best interests of the child.139 On the
other hand, it is not to be accorded any special weight and rarely is deter-
minative.1" The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that denial of an
adoption on grounds of the applicants' atheism would be unconstitu-
tional. 41 It is possible that other jurisdictions have not made similar
clear rulings because their courts have not been presented with this spe-
cific question; perhaps adoption agencies accept the fact that the presence
of religion is not to outweigh other indicia of fitness. 142
Several states have matching statutes that provide that, whenever
practicable, a child should be placed for adoption with parents of the
same religion as the child or the child's natural parents.143 The "when
practicable" language has enabled courts to construe the statute as a dec-
laration that religious matching is desirable, but not a requirement which
overrides evidence that a non-matching placement is in the child's best
interests. Where insistence on religious matching would substantially de-
lay placement of the child, 1" or cause denial of an application by partic-
ularly well-suited parents, 145 matching is not required. Interpreted in
this way, religious matching statutes have survived establishment clause
challenges. 146
Religious matching statutes raise two questions. First, are they meant
to protect the natural parents' interest in their child's religion, or are they
meant to address other concerns? Some courts indicate that religious
matching is not a significant factor where the natural parent is indifferent
to the child's new religious atmosphere. Others have held that the stat-
ute operates independent of the desires of the natural parents. 147 Second,
139. See In re Bourque, 245 So. 2d 525, 530 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Dickens v. Ernesto,
30 N.Y.2d 61, 64, 281 N.E.2d 153, 154, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (1972).
140. See, e.g., Dickens, 30 N.Y.2d at 64, 281 N.E.2d at 155, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 347
("Religion has always been a relevant and important, though not controlling, considera-
tion in this State in the placement of children for adoption."); Commonwealth v. White,
403 Pa. 55, 62, 169 A.2d 69, 73 (1961) ("Proper religious training of a child is most
important and a factor which must be given the most serious consideration .... How-
ever, such factor, while of great weight, is not controlling.").
141. In re Adoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36, 54, 279 A.2d 785, 794 (1971). The court,
however, did not object to consideration of religion as one factor in a broad analysis of
best interests.
142. This acceptance by adoption agencies is similar to the commonly asserted princi-
ple that religion in custody disputes between parents is relevant, but not determinative.
See supra notes 106-138 and accompanying text.
143. See Note, Religious Matching Statutes and Adoption, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 262, 262
n.1 (1976).
144. See In re Efrain C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 1025-26, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255, 263 (N.Y. City
Fam. Ct. 1970).
145. See In re Adoption of Michael D., 37 A.D.2d 78, 79, 322 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533
(1971).
146. See In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 652-53, 121 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955); Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 67-68, 281 N.E.2d 153,
156-57, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346, 350 (1972).
147. Compare In re Anonymous, 46 Misc. 2d 928, 929, 261 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1965) (when natural mother consents to different religious upbringing, match-
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where the prospective parents' religion is matched with that of the child,
how is the child's faith to be determined? A state might look to family
heritage, to formal religious acts such as baptism or circumcision,14 8 or
might arbitrarily allocate children to different religions.' 49 There has
been surprisingly little judicial discussion about the constitutional accept-
ability of such practices.15°
III. PURPOSES, EFFECTS, ENDORSEMENTS AND NEUTRALITY: CAN
THE USE OF RELIGION BE JUSTIFIED?
Nearly all would agree that the government's purpose in considering
religion may not be to promote religion for its own sake. The following
sections will identify and discuss possible secular purposes and effects
that might support the use of religion as an element in child custody and
adoption determinations.
A. Promoting the Welfare of the Child
Most child custody decisions acknowledge that ensuring the child's
best interests is the goal of such proceedings. Best interests, however,
can be defined in two different ways. 5  Best interests may mean the wel-
fare and happiness of the individual, as defined by that individual. What
course of action will lead to individual happiness, regardless of what soci-
ety may think about the reasons for that happiness? Best interests may
also refer to a set of more objective, socially approved standards. Is the
child likely to become a well-educated, law-abiding, productive member
of society?152
This dichotomy may be more theoretical than real. Individual happi-
ness may depend on the rewards society bestows on those who exhibit
approved behavior. Thus, a child may be placed in an environment
likely to promote development in socially approved ways in order to
make the child happy in the long run. Still, for purposes of analysis it is
helpful to separate the individual's subjective view of a good life from the
ing statute has little weight), with In re Goldman, 331 Mass. at 652-53, 121 N.E.2d at 846
(natural mother's consent does not override statutory mandate of matching).
One court has held that religious matching statutes are constitutional only insofar as
they further the stated preferences of the natural parent. See Note, Religious Matching
and Parental Preference: Easton v. Angus, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 559 (discussing an unre-
ported decision, Easton v. Angus, No. C084-1061W (D. Utah June 13, 1985)).
148. See Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceed-
ings, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 649 (1959).
149. At least one court has indicated that allocation without reference to natural par-
entage or parental preference would be unconstitutional. See Scott v. Family Ministries,
65 Cal. App. 3d 492, 505-06, 135 Cal. Rptr. 430, 438 (1976).
150. For a comprehensive summary of the discussion that has taken place, see Ram-
sey, supra note 148, at 680-84.
151. See Chambers, supra note 4, at 488-94.
152. See id. In other legal contexts, there may be a third way to define a child's best
interests, by deference to the view of the parents. But, of course, if parents disagree, there
is no view to which the state can defer. See id. at 489.
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community's objective view of the individual's welfare. If the choice is
between self-defined happiness and growth into socially approved roles,
libertarians would choose the former.153 For that reason, this Article
will define the child's welfare as subjective. That definition, however,
need not limit the inquiry to the child's subjective preferences at the time
of the decree; the child's subjective best interests in the long run may also
be considered. The state's interest in promoting objectively defined good
qualities will be considered as a factor distinct from the child's subjective
best interests.
1. Emotional Well-Being and Religion
Research has examined the relationship between religion and emo-
tional well-being. Professor Allen Bergin has analyzed studies conducted
from 1951 through 1979 in which some measure of religiousness was cor-
related with some measure of emotional health (such as self-esteem, ego
strength and adjustment) or pathology (such as hostility, anxiety or
neuroticism) 54 The results were mixed. Bergin concluded that the
literature provides "marginal support for a positive effect of religion." '55
More recent studies provide some assistance in reconciling these con-
tradictory findings. One of the most difficult challenges in attempting to
research the effects of religion is to find a reliable indicator of religion.
Studies have used church attendance, self-identification as a church
member and orthodox beliefs as indicative of the presence of religion." 6
Recently, social scientists have attempted to be more precise and sophis-
ticated in their measurement of religion and in doing so, have produced
some interesting results.
Paloutzian and Ellison have developed a 20-item questionnaire which
they have called the Spiritual Well-Being Scale (SWB). 15 7 The SWB
measures orientation to "transcendence, or the capacity to find purpose
153. "[M]ost Americans would be repulsed by a statute that abandoned a concern for
the child's interests and baldly provided for the resolution of their custody in the manner
that served the 'best interests of the state.' And well they should." Id. at 492.
154. See Bergin, Religiosity and Mental Health: A Critical Reevaluation and Meta-
Analysis, 14 Prof. Psychology Res. & Prac. 170 (1983).
155. Bergin found religion positively linked to mental health in 47 percent of reported
effects, negatively linked in 23 percent, with 30 percent showing no relationship. Most of
the positive or negative results were quite weak; only 7 of 30 outcomes produced statisti-
cally significant relationships between religion and mental health. Five of these showed
positive relationships, two negative. See id. at 176.
156. For an extensive survey of approaches to assessing religiosity, see Roof, Concepts
and Indicators ofReligious Commitment: A Critical Review, in The Religious Dimension:
New Directions in Quantitative Research 17-41 (R. Wuthnow ed. 1979). The use of a
single, static measure of religiosity, especially self-identification with a denomination, is
criticized by Larson in Systematic Analysis of Research on Religious Variables in Four
Major Psychiatric Journals, 1978-1982, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 329 (1986). Larson and his
colleagues found that psychiatric research in this area is less sophisticated than the work
of psychologists or sociologists. See id. at 333.
157. See Ellison, Spiritual Well-Being: Conceptualization and Measurement, 11 J. Psy-
chology & Theol. 330 (1983).
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and meaning beyond one's self and the immediate and to relate positively
to God, parenting and life experiences which promote trust and funda-
mental optimism." '158 In several studies, high SWB scores have been
found to correlate positively with a sense of hope,159 purpose in life," °
self-esteem 161 and social skills, 162 and to correlate negatively with loneli-
ness. 163 While the SWB findings are interesting, they may do no more
than add to the overall volume of contradictory findings on the relation-
ship of religion to secular well-being.
The SWB, however, is divisible into two distinct sub-measures. Ten of
the 20 items specifically refer to God and the extent to which the respon-
dent feels a sense of transcendence in traditional theistic terms. The re-
sponses on these 10 items are referred to as the Religious Well-Being
(RWB) subscale. 164 The other 10 measure a sense of purpose tran-
scending self, but without overt theistic overtones. This subscale has
been labelled Existential Well-Being (EWB). 165 While the SWB, RWB
and EWB scales all quite consistently correlate positively with measures
of emotional health and well being, the EWB subscale provides much
stronger support for this correlation than does the RWB subscale. 166
Empirical studies have shown that well-being is clearly furthered by
"transcendence, or the capacity to find purpose and meaning beyond
one's self and the immediate," but that traditional theism is not the sole
path to achieving that capacity.
167
2. The Importance of the Definition of Religion
These findings indicate that the inconsistency of earlier studies may
not arise from any lack of correlation between religion and well-being,
but rather suggest that the inconsistency stems from disagreement over
158. Id. at 338.
159. See Carson, Soeken & Grimm, Hope and its Relationship to Spiritual Well Being,
16 J. Psychology & Theol. 159, 163 (1988).
160. See Dufton & Perlman, The Association Between Religiosity and the Purpose-in-
Life Test: Does it Reflect Purpose or Satisfaction?, 14 J. Psychology & Theol. 42, 47
(1986).
161. See Ellison, supra note 157, at 336.
162. See id. at 335.
163. See Paloutzian & Ellison, Loneliness, Spiritual Well-Being and the Quality of Life,
in Loneliness: A Sourcebook of Current Theory, Research and Therapy 224, 234 (L.
Peplau & D. Perlman ed. 1982). If one accepts the connection between loneliness and
physical illness, see, e.g., J. Lynch, The Broken Heart: The Medical Consequences of
Loneliness passim (1977) (examining biological basis for need for human relationships
and ill effect of loneliness on health), then spiritual well being may also correlate with
physical health. See Ellison, supra note 157, at 338.
164. See Ellison, supra note 157, at 332-33.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 333-35 (data summarized in tables 1-3); see also Carson, Soecken &
Grimm, supra note 159, at 165-66 (reaching same conclusion in their study of correlation
of spiritual well being and hope). This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that it not
only surprised but apparently disappointed Carson and her colleagues. See Carson,
Soecken & Grimm, supra note 159, at 165-66.
167. Ellison, supra note 157, at 338.
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the meaning of the term "religion." It is, therefore, important to define
the term "religion" before attempting to defend or attack its place in any
legal analysis.
The classic Supreme Court statement concerning religion focused on
conventional Western theism, prayer and worship. The Court stated:
"The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will." '168 A religion was something
that resembled conventional Christianity, that is, an explicitly theistic
faith, oriented primarily toward other-worldly concerns, and most likely
practiced as a member of a recognized church. 6 9 This traditional defini-
tion, however, may no longer be valid.
Robert Bellah has described the evolution of religious thought, specifi-
cally the extent to which it focuses on transcendent, other-worldly con-
cerns as opposed to integrating itself into social concerns.170 Bellah has
noted that primitive religion was nearly indistinguishable from other as-
pects of community life.171 Religion then evolved into what Bellah calls
"historic religion," stressing its separateness from worldly concerns and
its "exaltation of another realm of reality as alone true and infinitely val-
uable." 1 72 That conception has been replaced in the last century by
"modern religion," which attempts to reunite transcendent and social
concerns.1 7 1 Changes in religion itself demanded reassessment of the
legal definition of the term.
The Supreme Court recognized, in the 1961 case of Torcaso v. Wat-
kins, 74 that there could be religions "which do not teach what would
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God." '75 More signifi-
cantly, in a pair of Vietnam war era cases clarifying eligibility of draft-
age men for conscientious objector status based on "religious training
168. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
169. This definition was probably inevitable because the overwhelming majority of
Americans who called themselves religious (as well as those who denied religious lean-
ings) came from a tradition of conventional Judeo-Christian thought and practice. There
was little reason to question this conventional thinking because, prior to the 1960's, there
was little religion clause jurisprudence. See supra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
170. See Bellah, Religious Evolution, 29 Am. Soc. Rev. 358, 374 (1964).
171. See id. at 360. Bellah found early religion to be a primitive stage in which religion
was almost impossible to distinguish from other aspects of community life. See id.
172. Id. at 359. This stage, known as "historic religion," resulted from an evolution of
ideas in which religion became more differentiated from community life by focusing on
the transcendent. See id. at 366. Historic religions, then, are transcendental, they stress
the separateness of religious and political structures, and seek to set the believer apart
from ordinary worldly concerns. "The differentiation of a religious elite brought a new
level of tension and a new possibility of conflict and change onto the social scene." Id. at
368.
173. See id.
174. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). The case held unconstitutional Maryland's requirement that
public officers declare belief in God.
175. Id. at 495 n. 11 (Court cited Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture and Secular Hu-
manism as examples).
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and belief," '17 6 the Court endorsed a broad definition of that term.177
The Court held that religious belief could include any comprehensive
system of ultimate concerns that creates "duties superior to those arising
from any human relation,"178 regardless of whether the belief was articu-
lated in theistic terms or practiced in a traditional church or sect. 179
Courts have applied this broad, non-traditional definition in both estab-
lishment clause and free exercise clause cases.' 8° The scope of religion,
while far broader than under a traditional definition, is not limitless.18 1
Furthermore, the broad definition has been criticized as being fuzzy. 8 2
The choice of a definition will have significant impact on the outcome
of this analysis. If religion is narrowly defined as traditional theism or
church membership, there is no reason to believe that a religious up-bringing is more consistent with the best interests of a child than a non-
religious upbringing."' But if the broad view of religion, defined as a
176. Military Selective Service Act of June 24, 1948, Ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (codified as
amended at § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. § 456j) (Appendix, 1982)).
177. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 164-66 (1965).
178. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173-85 (discussing meaning of "religious training and belief,"
as defined by Congress and included in early version of Selective Service Act) (citation
omitted); see Welsh, 398 U.S. at 338-44 (same). In reaching this holding, the Court drew
heavily on liberal Protestant thought. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180-81 (citing work of Dr.
Paul Tillich and Bishop John Robinson).
179. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 177-78. The Court cautioned that the definition was only
for the purposes of interpreting the Selective Service Act, see id. at 174, but the definition
has been widely adopted. The broad definition may have been required to avoid holding
the entire 60) exemption unconstitutional as an establishment clause violation. See
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 344-67 (Harlan, J., concurring).
180. See, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1036 (3d Cir.) ("Naturalist"
movement MOVE found not to be a religion, even under Seeger and Welsh standards for
purposes of free exercise claim), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982); Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197, 199 (3d Cir. 1979) (transcendental meditation found to be a religion for estab-
lishment clause purposes).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting plain-
tiff's claim that set of beliefs promoted by government constituted a religion of "nuclear-
ism"); Africa, 662 F.2d at 1036 (MOVE not a religion for free exercise purposes).
182. The definition has been criticized by those who advocate a return to the narrower
definition of religion and by those who advocate the use of different definitions depending
upon the interest involved. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-6, at 827-28
(1978) (advocating two different definitions); see also Note, Toward a Constitutional Defi-
nition of Religion, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1056 (1978) (advocating different definitions). While
there are cases that endorse a dual definition approach, see Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F.
Supp. 766, 774-75 (D. Ariz. 1963), more typical is the rejection of the notion that the
same word can have two different meanings in the same sentence of the first amendment,
as found in Malnak. See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 211 (Adams, J., concurring); see also
Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 579, 605 (close
examination of operative doctrine for religion clauses suggests dual definition of religion
not required). Professor Tribe appears to have had second thoughts on this subject, call-
ing the dual definition approach "a dubious solution to a problem that, on closer inspec-
tion, may not exist at all," and turns his attention from the definition of "religion" to the
definition of "free exercise" and "establishment." L. Tribe, supra note 69, § 14-6, at
1186-87 (2d ed. 1988).
183. See supra notes 85-105 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Mangrum, Exclusive
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commitment to some "ultimate concern," a coherent set of beliefs that
transcend and give meaning to everyday existence contained in cases
such as Torcaso and Seeger184 is used, then there is consistent evidence
that religion is a source of mental and emotional well-being. Keeping
this important definitional point in mind, the proposition that the use of
religion as a factor in custody or adoption decisions has the purpose and
effect of promoting the welfare of the child, clearly a legitimate secular
interest, may not be easily dismissed.
Also significant in any discussion of the welfare of the child is the
value of stability. Since the publication in 1973 of Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit's Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,'85 in which the authors
emphasized the importance to the child of continuity of relationships and
recommended legal standards to further that goal as much as possible,186
courts have stressed the value of stability and certainty in child custody
arrangements.18 7 While these conclusions have not been unanimously
accepted and, indeed, call into question the wisdom of increasingly popu-
lar joint custody arrangements,' 88 the widespread acceptance of stability
as a value in furthering the best interests of the child should be noted in
addressing the issues under discussion here.
B. Promoting the Welfare of Society
The best interests test may seem, at least in part, as meant to promote
the shaping of "good" children, rather than merely happy children.
While the legitimacy of this goal could be challenged, it would seem to
Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitutional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody
Cases, 15 Creighton L. Rev. 25, 55-74 (1981) (arguing that use of religion as factor is
unconstitutional except where child has actual religious needs or, as negative factor
where parent's religious practices are illegal or "threaten imminent and substantial
harm" to child); Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes:
Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1702, 1728-29 (1984)
(arguing that religion may be factor only when child has personal religious convictions);
Note, supra note 143, at 283 (arguing against constitutionality of religious matching
statutes).
184. See supra notes 168-182 and accompanying text.
185. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973).
186. See id. at 31-39 (discussion of continuity of relationships).
187. See A. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody Cases 34-35 (1983). Court decisions
stressing stability and certainty may not be the result of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's
book, but the courts have relied on the book extensively. Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child has been cited over 150 times-12 times by federal courts (Westlaw, federal library,
Allfeds file) and 147 times by state courts (Westlaw, states library, Allstates file).
There has been much criticism of Goldstein and his colleagues for their failure to sup-
port their conclusions with empirical evidence. These critics, however, tend to focus not
on the overall value of consistency, but on the difficulty of assessing the best way to
provide consistency and particularly on Goldstein and his colleagues' conclusion that the
visitation rights of the non-custodial parent should be sharply limited. See generally
Rohman, Sales & Lou, The Best Interests of the Child in Custody Disputes, in Psychology
and Child Custody Determinations 59, 70-75 (L. Weithorn ed. 1987).




qualify as secular as long as the definition of a "good" person does not
include religion for its own sake. One commentator argues that values
perceived to be objectively desirable will inevitably creep into custody
decisions, openly or covertly. He further states "a court would be justi-
fied in candidly ... preferring the parent whose values more closely re-
flect such qualities as tolerance, charity, compassion, a sense of social
duty, respect for independence of mind. . ., whether the cultural values
in conflict have a secular or religious origin."1 9 This list is certainly a
respectable short catalogue of values that a liberal society might seek to
promote. Can religion be used in child custody and adoption decisions as
a way to further and strengthen secular values in children and, therefore,
in society?
Research has been undertaken to explore the connections between reli-
gious belief and social attitudes. As was the case with social science liter-
ature on the connection between religion and emotional well-being, a
quick overview of the research establishes no clear connections between
religious belief and social values. Studies disagree on whether religion is
linked with juvenile delinquency or other clearly anti-social behavior 190
and early research indicated a positive link between religiousness and ra-
cial prejudice and intolerance. 191 The mere existence of religiosity, then,
would not seem to be reliable evidence of an environment likely to pro-
mote the pro-social values respected in a liberal democratic community.
Once again, however, more precise consideration of the evidence pro-
vides more meaningful information. While there is no indication that
religion per se is linked to positive social values and behavior, there is
reason to believe that this is true in certain types of religion. The distinc-
tion is not between any particular denomination and others,192 but rather
between two types of religiousness labeled by sociologist Gordon Allport
as "intrinsic" and "extrinsic." 193
Intrinsic religious believers are seriously committed to their religious
189. Mucci, The Effect of Religious Beliefs in Child Custody Disputes, 5 Can. J. Farn.
Law 353, 360-61 (1986) (emphasis in original).
190. See Jensen & Erickson, The Religious Factor and Delinquency: Another Look at
the Hellfire Hypothesis, in The Religious Dimension: New Directions in Quantitative
Research 157-77 (R. Wuthnow ed. 1979). Jensen and Erickson summarize the conflicting
earlier research. See id. at 157-60. Their own study leads them to conclude that "the
view that organized religion is ineffective or irrelevant [in controlling delinquency]" is
both supported and refuted "depending on the particular findings one chooses to high-
light." Id. at 174-75.
191. See generally T. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson & R. Sanford, The
Authoritarian Personality 212 (1950) (discussing prejudice and intolerance); Allport &
Kramer, Some Roots of Prejudice, 22 J. Psychology 25-26 (1946).
192. The major finding of Wuthnow is that, in general, denomination is becoming far
less of an indicator of the substance of religious belief in America than the question of
whether one's religious beliefs are liberal or conservative. See generally R. Wuthnow,
supra note 106, passim.
193. Allport, The Religious Context of Prejudice, 5 J. Sci. Study Religion 447, 454-56
(1966).
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beliefs and treat those beliefs as valuable in themselves.194 Extrinsic be-
lievers, in contrast, conform their acts and beliefs to religious norms in
order to achieve other ends, such as social acceptance. 195 Allport, whose
early research indicated a positive correlation between religion and racial
prejudice, 196 modified his position on the basis of this dichotomy. Intrin-
sic religious belief was found to indicate low levels of prejudice; extrinsic
religiosity, on the other hand, was "entirely compatible with preju-
dice."'1 97 This intrinsic-extrinsic distinction has been widely accepted
and extended by others to indicate that intrinsic religiosity is linked to
traits such as friendliness and helpfulness. 9 '
Others who have challenged the value of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinc-
tion have attempted to forge other meaningful ways of categorizing reli-
gions that will correlate reliably with pro-social attitudes. 199 Perhaps the
most interesting approach is the "quest" orientation to religion. Daniel
Batson and his colleagues have contended that the best religious indica-
tor of low prejudice is religiosity "in which religion is an open-ended
process of pursuing ultimate questions more than ultimate answers,"' 200
that is, in which religion is a "quest." When religion is commitment to a
closed set of norms, they report, it does not lead to low levels of
prejudice.20'
Despite continuing skepticism,2" 2 there is substantial evidence that
religious beliefs can bring about socially desirable attitudes and behavior.
However, this is so only for certain types of religiosity, types which cut
across denominational lines. This section is merely attempting to iden-
tify and examine possible secular purposes and effects that might justify
the use of religion as a factor in custody and adoption proceedings.
194. See id. at 455.
195. See id.
196. See Allport & Kramer, supra note 191, at 378.
197. Allport, supra note 193, at 456; see also Allport & Ross, Personal Religious Orien-
tation and Prejudice, 5 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 432, 434-35 (1967).
198. See Donahue, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiousness: Review and Meta-Analysis, 48
J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 400, 415-16 (1985); Morgan, A Research Note on Reli-
gion and Morality: Are Religious People Nice People?, 61 Soc. Forces 683, 691 (1983).
199. See Griffin, Gorsuch & Davis, A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Religious Orienta-
tion, Social Norms, and Prejudice, 26 J. Sci. Study Religion 358, 364-65 (1987) (intrinsic
religiosity correlates negatively with prejudice only when overall culture sends message
that prejudice is socially undesirable); Roof, Religious Orthodoxy and Minority Prejudice:
Causal Relationship or Reflection of Localistic World View?, 80 Am. J. Soc. 643, 660-61
(1979) (rather than standing in cause-effect relationship, racial prejudice and certain reli-
gious beliefs are both reflections of narrow world view and limited social perspectives).
200. Batson, Naifeh & Pate, Social Desirability, Religious Orientation and Racial Preju-
dice, 17 J. Sci. Study Religion 31, 40 (1978).
201. See id. Like Griffin and his colleagues, see Griffin, Gorsuch & Davis, supra note
199, at 358-59, Batson and his colleagues consider intrinsic religiousness a reliable indica-
tor of absence of prejudice only where supported by social norms. See Batson, Naifeh &
Pate, supra note 200, at 36. They find, however, that "quest" religious orientation corre-
lates with low prejudice regardless of social desirability. See id. at 37-40.
202. See Griffin, Gorsuch & Davis, supra note 199, at 363-65.
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Thus, the discussion of the constitutional significance of these findings
will follow later in the Article.
C. Protection of the Rights of Individuals or Groups
The obvious tension between the establishment and free exercise
clauses frequently forces courts to classify a dispute as being over free
exercise or over the establishment of religion. In doing so, courts allow
the protection of free exercise to itself serve as a legitimate purpose and
effect in establishment clause analysis.203 The use of religion as a factor
in custody or adoption cases might be justified as furthering several types
of rights.
The most obvious of the rights legitimately protected in custody cases
are the free exercise rights of parents. Insisting that parents curtail reli-
gious practices or violate religious precepts in order to gain or retain
rights of custody or visitation raises serious constitutional questions.
Rules should be structured at least to minimize any interference with
parents' free exercise of religion.
Closely related, in this context, to the parents' free exercise rights are
the rights of parents to shape the values and education of their children
and to exercise control over family life. Courts traditionally recognized
the right of parents to guide the education and development of their chil-
dren and have deferred to the judgment of parents in these areas.2°
While this right is not unlimited,205 Supreme Court decisions upholding
the right of parents to send their children to parochial school 206 or to
have their children learn foreign languages207 predate the recognition of
strong free exercise rights.
Similarly, the free exercise rights of the child, although often difficult
to assess, should be respected. Significant cases involving children and
free exercise rights tend to arise in situations in which the parent pursues
the child's right; it is difficult to assess whether the court is considering
the right of the parent or of the child.2 °0 The very concept of a child
having a religion, independent of that of the parents, can be troublesome,
203. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (Lemon test requires that a
government policy's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion").
204. "It is not seriously debatable that the parental right to guide one's child intellectu-
ally and religiously is a most substantial part of the liberty and freedom of the parent."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925); see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923) ("it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suita-
ble to their station in life").
205. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute prohibiting minors
from selling newspapers and other articles on street doesn't violate freedom of religion);
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504-05 (W.D. Wash. 1967)
(denying parents' right to refuse transfusion for children), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per
curiam).
206. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
207. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
208. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
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especially in the case of younger children.20 9
In some cases it is proper to speak of a child's own free exercise right,
independent of that of the parents. Where a child is old enough to artic-
ulate particular religious beliefs, to feel a sense of membership and to
identify as an adherent of some religion, the child should be seen to have
some rights of independent free exercise. This Article will not attempt a
complete exploration of the scope of these rights, but merely notes that
respect for such rights may qualify as a legitimate purpose for govern-
ment use of religious factors in custody and adoption decisions.
Religious communities have some sort of rights in these disputes.
With specific reference to the religion clauses, a long line of precedent
recognizes that religious organizations have the right to a greater degree
of freedom in conducting their affairs than would apply to ordinary cor-
porate entities.210 Supreme Court decisions protecting parental rights
and individual free exercise rights have sometimes largely drawn on the
connection between those rights and the need of a religious community
to sustain itself.2
11
Most prominent among these decisions is Wisconsin v. Yoder,21 2 which
deferred to the customs of the Amish community even while discussing
individual free exercise and familial rights.213 The Wisconsin statute in
Yoder threatened the existence of the community. In the case of a reli-
gious community with a long history and clearly defined rules, preserva-
tion of the community was seen as a positive constitutional value.2 14
158 (1944); Grove v. Mead School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
826 (1985).
209. See generally Ramsey, supra note 148, at 649 (discussing legally imputing religion
to young children).
210. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976)
("the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to
establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government"); Pres-
byterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 449 (1969) (first amendment "commands civil courts to decide church property dis-
putes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine"); Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952) ("when the property right follows
as an incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the
church rule controls").
211. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1972). In Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), a religious order challenged the state restriction, invoking
their own rights as well as those of parents and children. See id. at 535-36. In Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the maintenance of fluency in the language of their par-
ents was at issue and was intimately tied to the maintenance of the immigrant communi-
ties' cultural and religious heritage. See id. at 398-401; C. Curran, American Catholic
Social Ethics: Twentieth Century Approaches 92-98 (1982) (discussing historical preser-
vation of fluency as cultural foundation for German Americans).
212. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
213. Expert testimony was introduced to the effect that the Wisconsin statute "would
... ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community." Id.
at 212. At least with respect to the Amish, preservation of the individual's free exercise
right was seen as inextricably linked to the preservation of the community. See id. at 217-
19.
214. See id. at 223-27.
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Where "group rights" come into conflict with claims of individual rights,
they most likely will not prevail, but where there is no such clash of
rights claims, government should take seriously the claims of religious
groups to some basic rights, most narrowly the right to a continued
existence.
Respect for the right of a religious community to perpetuate itself
could raise an establishment clause concern as undue solicitousness to-
ward religion, precisely the type of "establishment" forbidden by the first
amendment. But the preservation of distinct voices and minority cul-
tures may not be the sort of endorsement that threatens first amendment
values.215
This section has identified and discussed interests that might be put
forward by government to justify the use of religion in custody or adop-
tion decisions. When asked for a legitimate secular purpose or effect of
such use, government may plausibly argue (a) furtherance of the welfare
of the child, (b) promotion of values in its citizens that will benefit society
or (c) protection of rights, with respect to religion, held by children, their
parents or religious communities. A framework has now been estab-
lished to analyze the issues put forward in Part II and to determine
whether current law is consistent with first amendment norms.
IV. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: ARE CURRENT STANDARDS
CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFIED?
As discussed earlier, under the establishment clause test that courts
currently apply, a challenged practice must have a secular purpose, a
primary secular effect and must avoid excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Justice O'Connor's increasingly influential ap-
proach focuses on whether a government practice has endorsed or cre-
ated the perception of endorsing religion. This will turn, to a large
extent, on the same purposes and effects of the government acts. As
noted above, free exercise issues arise where a parent must choose be-
tween religious practices and custody or visitation of children. Both reli-
gion clauses are implicated when government uses religion as a factor in
child custody or adoption decisions. Are current approaches constitu-
tionally valid?
215. See R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 221-25 (1985); L. Tribe, supra note 69,
§ 16-2, at 1521-44 (2d ed. 1988). Dworkin supports the principle that government sup-
port targeted to preserve voices that cannot survive through the workings of the market-
place produces a more diverse society, and is therefore consistent with first amendment
pluralism. See id.
For a discussion of the role of adoption in threatening minority cultures in another
context, see McCartney, The American Indian Child-Welfare Crisis: Cultural Genocide
or First Amendment Protection, 7 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 529 (1975).
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A. May Religion Be Considered in Determining the
Best Interests of the Child?
May statutes and judicial decisions weigh the likelihood that a child
will receive a religious upbringing in making custody decisions? If so,
may they do so only where there are clear, individualized showings of
physical or emotional consequences to the child, including, in the case of
a mature child, where the child has "actual" religious needs?216 In these
limited situations, consideration of religion seems fully justified. An indi-
vidualized showing of secular benefit or harm to the child will suffice as a
primary secular effect, seeking such benefit or avoiding such harm is a
secular purpose and determining the presence of such an effect requires
no more intrusive an inquiry than that which takes place in a custody
hearing free of religious considerations. Seeking to determine and fur-
ther the religious beliefs of a mature child can both further the child's
welfare, particularly the child's need for stability, and protect a mature
child's emerging free exercise rights.
As outlined above, however, a number of statutes or courts do not
limit the use of religion to these narrow situations, but regard the pres-
ence of religion as a positive factor in assessing the quality of a family
environment.217 Commentators who have criticized this tendency are
right to feel uneasy, but their recommendations that religion be excluded
from the best interests test misconstrues the source of the problem.218
The findings of social scientists outlined above indicate that a commit-
ment to values beyond self does promote a happier, better adjusted life.
The same findings, though, strongly indicate that this commitment need
not be framed in terms of traditional theism.219 Resolution of the ques-
tion, therefore, turns on the question of the definition of "religion."
If the definition of religion is limited to traditional theism or church
affiliation, there is great doubt concerning the constitutionality of the use
of religion as a positive factor in custody or adoption disputes. There is
only weak social science support for the proposition that such a policy
will produce happier children or children who will be "better" citizens.
Although weak evidence may be sufficient to satisfy the inquiry into the
government's purpose for a policy (an inquiry which has never been ap-
plied too stringently),22 ° it falls well short of establishing legitimate secu-
216. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
218. See Mangrum, supra note 9, at 51-74.
219. See supra notes 154-166 and accompanying text.
220. "Even if the text and official history of a statute express no secular purpose, the
statute should be held to have an improper purpose only if it is beyond purview that
endorsement of religion or a religious belief 'was and is the law's reason for existence.'"
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108 (1968)). Epperson, one of only a handful of Supreme Court
establishment clause cases which found a violation of the secular purpose requirement,
did so only upon a finding that no secular policy whatever was supported by the statute,
an extremely difficult burden to meet. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106-09.
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lar effects. The statement that traditional religiosity is a positive factor
and its absence a negative factor endorses traditional religions, running
afoul of Justice O'Connor's establishment clause test, and could act to
coerce parents into professing beliefs which they do not hold to establish
themselves as qualified for custody. Such coercive efforts are extremely
troubling even according to the most cautious theories of the scope of the
establishment clause.221
If, however, the expansive definition of religion as ultimate concern is
employed, an entirely different picture emerges. The evidence that peo-
ple whose values transcend self-interest report higher levels of emotional
well-being supports the contention that the secular purpose and effect of
enhancing the well-being of the child justifies consideration of the values
espoused by contending parents. Evidence that a parent believes, acts
pursuant to and intends to convey the message that life is purposeful,
that it demands commitment beyond self-interest and that there are tran-
scendent values, need not be excluded from best interest determinations.
Indeed, such evidence should be included.
If the law must treat the parent whose values are rooted in secular
philosophies the same as parents with theistic value systems, could all
references to religion in custody disputes be replaced with references to
morality? While a case could be made for such a conclusion, the fact
remains that a large proportion of Americans do enunciate their tran-
scendent commitments in traditional religious terms.222 To exclude the
"spiritual" might disadvantage those whose approach to providing values
to their children is closely linked to traditional religion. Still, references
to "religion" or "spiritual values" in statutes and cases do convey, both
to the public and to judges, that government favors conventional religion.
Should the language of courts and legislatures be modified to delete this
language, even if evidence of religious commitment is still used to estab-
lish a parent's moral and ethical values?
Perhaps a better solution would be to make the language more rather
than less extensive. Rather than considering religion as an independent
factor, or deleting it and referring only to the moral well-being of the
child, states using the best interests test should consider the moral envi-
ronment likely to be present in the child's home; determination of the
moral environment would include consideration of the religious environ-
ment. This approach would allow consideration of factors that are rele-
vant, which may include the presence of traditional religious values, yet
221. See McConnell, supra note 67, at 936. Justice Kennedy regards coercion as one of
the key indices of an establishment clause violation, along with the grant of substantial
"direct benefits." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3136 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
222. Despite a sense of increasing secularization of American society, polling data con-
tinues to show that 90 percent or more of Americans profess a belief in God, about the
same percentage pray at least occasionally, about one-half say that religion is very impor-
tant to them, and about 40 percent attend church in a typical week. See R. Wuthnow,
supra note 106, at 164-65.
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explicitly place on an equal footing coherent systems of values that are
not rooted in traditional religion.
If the definition of religion is expanded, or if a narrowly defined reli-
gion is one of several factors in establishing a commitment to a value
system transcending self-interest, the establishment clause should be no
bar to the use of religion as a factor in determining the best interests of
the child. This use of religion has a legitimate secular purpose and effect,
treats traditional religion no better or worse than competing systems of
ultimate values, and does not endorse traditional religion. It may be true
that all questions of moral and ethical values should not weigh heavily in
most custody disputes.223 But even in the absence of "actual religious
needs" of the child, the religion clauses do not bar the use of religion as a
positive factor in these determinations.
B. May Courts Weigh the Merits of Different Religions?
Social science gives us almost no reason to believe that, even if it is
possible to agree that there are certain values which children should be
taught, these values are associated with any particular denomination.224
But at the same time, as social scientists refine their measures of religious
commitment, they are able to make statements about certain types of
religions in ways that cut across denominational lines.225
This discussion will assume that certain types of religion, such as "in-
ner-directed," "quest-oriented" or "liberal" 226 cut across denominational
lines and can be correlated with valued social attitudes, such as tolerance,
charity and social duty. This discussion also assumes that the commit-
ment of a state to neutrality on most value questions does not require
neutrality about the value of these very traits that underlie a liberal dem-
ocratic commitment.227 Promoting these values by placing children in
religious environments likely to further them might have a secular pur-
pose and effect.
Even if such placements do further desirable social attitudes, however,
it would not justify a change in current practice. Here, Justice
O'Connor's concern for the appearance of endorsement is strikingly rele-
223. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text (discussing Burnham v. Burn-
ham, 208 Neb. 498, 503, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (1981), in which inclusion of moral and
ethical values resulted in maternal loss of custody because of mother's adherence to reli-
gious beliefs court felt were not in best interests of child).
224. See supra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
226. Allport developed the "intrinsic-extrinsic" distinction. See Allport, supra note
193, at 454. Batson and his colleagues employ the "quest" typology. See Batson, Naifeh
& Pate, supra note 200, at 40; supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text. Wuthnow
sees the key distinction in contemporary American religion to be its split, across denomi-
national lines, into liberal and conservative camps. See R. Wuthnow, supra note 106, at
132-72.
227. For example, a state need not be neutral about the value of equal respect for all
citizens and the value of rationality. See generally B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the
Liberal State 15-17 (1980).
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vant. A mechanical application of the test of secular purpose and effect
might justify favoring some religions over others. This result, however, is
starkly inconsistent with the almost universally accepted proposition that
the religion clauses forbid government preference of one religion. 28
Even if a preference is expressed in categories that cut across denomina-
tional lines, government endorsement of certain types of religions as good
and others as bad, or perhaps not as good, for society is inconsistent with
the values behind the religion clauses.
This issue presents a fine illustration of the virtues of Justice
O'Connor's non-endorsement test as an alternative, or supplement, to the
Lemon standard. In advocating explicit approval of religions that teach
toleration and other pro-social values, Joseph Mucci states that because
decision-makers will silently take these values into account, open en-
dorsement is a preferable option.229 But Mucci (writing not of the first
amendment, but of the freedom of religion clause of the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms) ignores the social implications of open en-
dorsement. It may be true that subtle religious preference will enter into
custody decisions in any event, but explicit judicial approval of some reli-
gious sentiments as pro-social and non-endorsement or disparagement of
others is so inconsistent with first amendment values that even a certain
amount of hypocrisy seems preferable.
The rule that one system of transcendent values is not to be preferred
over another, then, seems warranted. It is also probably inevitable that
an exception will be maintained for extreme cases of demonstrable harm
to a particular child,230 but that exception should be invoked sparingly
and with emphasis on the consequences of the particular decision, rather
than the social impact of the religious doctrine or practice involved.
C. May Courts Determine Which Parent Would Provide a Better
Religious Upbringing?
Establishment clause concerns are less troubling when both parents
express allegiance to the same set of religious values. Because no choice
need be made between competing religions, or between religion (however
defined) and irreligion, the possibility of a perception of endorsement is
greatly reduced. If a court limits its inquiry to easily ascertainable fac-
tors such as the proximity of parents to religious facilities, 231 no serious
establishment clause problems exist; the court is merely accepting the
values which the parents both agree should be conveyed to the child and
228. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
230. At present, exceptions are typically maintained for cases of demonstrable harm to
a child. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., T. v. H., 102 N.J. Super. 38, 40-42, 245 A.2d 221, 222-23 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. 1968) (father awarded custody of children when separation agreement specified
Jewish upbringing of children and father was best able to provide same), aff'd, 110 N.J.
Super. 8, 264 A.2d 244 (N.J. Super. Ct., A.D. 1970).
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seeking to determine who is in a better position to convey them. This is
merely deference to parental choice and therefore sufficiently secular in
purpose and effect.
Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the court is not actually
being asked to choose between religious philosophies. Parents may be-
long to the same denomination, but differ sharply on value questions; this
difference may be reflected in frequency of church attendance or the rigor
with which official church teaching is followed at home. In such a case, a
court may be faced with what is actually a dispute between different "re-
ligions." Contrast the case in which both parents agree that the child
should be raised in a certain religion, but only one plans to reside in a
community with a church and school of the faith, with a case in which
parents, both professing allegiance to a certain faith, disagree about how
often a child should attend church or whether a child should enroll in a
church-affiliated school.232 A finding in the first scenario that one parent
is more likely to provide a better religious environment for the child is a
far more neutral statement than the same finding in the latter case. The
latter case may present a choice between different religious conceptions.
In addition, the second case also presents more clearly than the first the
possibility that a court will be asked to make a decision as to what consti-
tutes a "good" member of a certain religion. Such a determination
presents severe problems under the non-entanglement prong of the
Lemon test.233 Thus, a court declaration of which parent is likely to pro-
vide a superior religious environment when both parents adhere to the
same religion may be warranted in some cases but should be permitted
only if great care is taken to ensure that, in fact, a particular case really
does present this type of problem, rather than a clash of different reli-
gious conceptions sharing the same label.
D. May Courts Limit the Religious Activity of Non-Custodial Parents
During Visitation Periods?
Limitation of the non-custodial parent's religious activity calls for
analysis under the free exercise clause, rather than establishment clause.
An order limiting religious activity during visitation will typically be jus-
tified by the value of stability and the need to prevent confusion in the
232. Compare id. (awarding custody to father based on proximity to religious facili-
ties), with Applebaum v. Hames, 159 Ga. App. 552, 553-54, 284 S.E.2d 58, 59-60 (1981)
(denying modification of custody award requested solely on basis of Jewish father's fail-
ure to provide children with level of religious training which Jewish mother felt appropri-
ate) and Klaus v. Klaus, 509 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (failure to take child
to church cannot be equated with failure to provide child with moral training).
233. The fundamental principle of the cases discussed, see supra notes 210-214 and
accompanying text, is that a court may not decide which of two competing groups, phi-
losophies or doctrines "truly" represents a particular religion and that this principle is a
crucial part of the non-entanglement requirement. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 216,
§ 14-11, at 1231-42 (detailing development and importance of "doctrinal entanglement").
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mind of the child,23 4 or as furthering the custodial parent's right to con-
trol the child's religious education.235 Neither of these goals seem to be
invalid under the Lemon "purpose and effect" analysis, and the message
conveyed by the policy also seems to be concern for the welfare of the
child or the rights of the custodial parent rather than any religious en-
dorsement by government.236
However, to condition regular contact with the non-custodial parent
on some limitation of that parent's religious practice is obviously troub-
ling. In applying free exercise analysis to this question, courts will con-
sider the preservation of the best interests of the child to be a compelling
government interest.237 Thus, courts must turn to the degree of the re-
striction on the parent's rights and the question of whether the restriction
is narrowly tailored to further the government's interests. In considering
these restrictions, courts should distinguish three types of requirements:
(a) that the non-custodial parent act to ensure that the child fulfill reli-
gious obligations in the faith in which the child is being raised; (b) that
prohibit the non-custodial parent from involving the child in religious
activity outside the home; and (c) that the non-custodial parent not dis-
cuss religion with the child and not expose the child to religion in the
home or day-to-day life of the parent.
These three types of restrictions involve different levels of interference
with free exercise rights. The first, typified by a requirement that the
non-custodial parent drive the child to church and pick the child up after
services, 2 38 does no more than require that the parent act with respect
and consideration toward someone of a different faith. While it might be
possible to hypothesize some sort of religious duty to refuse to cooperate
in any way with another's education in the "wrong" religion, such a duty
is inconsistent with the religious liberalism called for by the Constitution.
This type of narrow restriction seems well-tailored to fulfill the legitimate
purposes of the court's order in the child custody or adoption proceeding
and seems to present little or no free exercise difficulty.
The second type of restriction requires more consideration. An order
234. See, e.g., Bentley v. Bentley, 86 A.D.2d 926, 927, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (1982)
(finding actual evidence of harm to child from parents' conflicting religious beliefs); Mor-
ris v. Morris, 271 Pa. Super. 19, 34, 412 A.2d 139, 147 (1979) (restricting visiting parent
from taking child on religious door to door solicitations).
235. See, e.g., Pardue v. Pardue, 285 So.2d 552, 555 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (father must
comply with custodial mother's desires on religious instruction for children in order to
retain Sunday visitation rights); Chapman v. Chapman, 352 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (custodial parent's decisions on religion receive judicial deference unless deci-
sions can be shown to endanger child's well-being).
236. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text; supra notes 195-199 and accom-
panying text; see also J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, supra note 32, at 7-8.
237. See supra notes 125-138 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Overman v. Overman, 497 N.E.2d 618, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (non-
custodial father required to transport child to and from catechism during visitation);
Chapman, 352 N.W.2d at 441 (non-custodial parent must transport children to mass in
compliance with custodial parent's wishes).
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to refrain from taking the child to the non-custodial parent's church on
weekends might, as a practical matter, impede the parent from fulfilling
his or her own religious obligations. It is also possible that a parent
might feel a positive religious duty to expose his or her child to the
"true" religion.239 As a result, these situations must be considered on a
case-by-case basis. Courts should inquire into the specific facts of each
case with special emphasis on the degree to which the restriction hinders
the non-custodial parent, how offensive it is to the religious beliefs of the
custodial parent and whether there is any evidence that the practice is
having an adverse effect on the child. Particular care should be taken to
determine whether the parents are sincerely attempting to maximize the
welfare of all parties involved, or whether either parent is using religion
in an attempt to "win" the child by making the child reject the other
parent's faith.2' As a general rule, these restrictions should be allowed
less freely than those discussed above, but more freely than those to be
discussed in the following paragraphs.
The third type of restriction is the most troubling. To require that a
parent refrain from normal, personal religious activity in the home241 or
from sharing that part of the parent's own personality with a child repre-
sents an unwarranted intrusion on the parent's religious rights. At the
same time, exposure to the non-custodial parent's religion in this way
educates the child about religious pluralism and reveals that even people
the child loves will hold diverse views on religious subjects.
It would be unwise, however, to state an absolute rule that restrictions
of this third type are always violations of free exercise rights. It is possi-
ble that parents could use in-home proselytizing as a weapon against the
other parent, and court intervention in such a case might be permissible.
In such cases, however, courts should uphold restrictions only when
there is clear and concrete evidence that the non-custodial parent's be-
havior is harming the child.242
239. See Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 238, 418 N.E.2d 606, 609 (1981).
240. See generally Lewis v. Lewis, 260 Ark. 691, 693, 543 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (1976)
(father's religious teachings aimed at instilling disrespect and disobedience to mother);
Gamble v. Gamble, 477 P.2d 383, 388 (Okla. 1970) (father told son that mother was
possessed by devil but still had unsupervised visitation privileges). As divorce itself be-
comes less dependent upon a finding of one party's fault, it may be that the psychological
need to vent the anger and pain behind the divorce which once went into the trial of the
issue of fault shifts to issues that are still the subject of dispute, including the legal and
emotional control over children. "A custody battle places a child in many difficult roles:
mediator, weapon, pawn, bargaining chip, trophy, go-between or even spy." Elster, supra
note 4, at 24.
241. See, e.g., Kadin v. Kadin, 131 A.D.2d 437, 440, 515 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870 (1987)
(non-custodial father need not allow children visiting on sabbath to speak with mother by
telephone in violation of father's religious beliefs); Morris v. Morris, 271 Pa. Super. 19,
34-35, 412 A.2d 139, 147 (1979) (non-custodial parent prohibited from taking child on
door-to-door religious solicitation but could discuss his beliefs with child during
visitation).
242. See Bentley v. Bentley, 86 A.D.2d 926, 927, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (1982).
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E. May the Religion of Prospective Parents Be a Factor
in Adoption Proceedings?
For the most part, the same concerns and conclusions present in the
discussion of religion in child custody proceedings will be present in
adoption proceedings. 43 One additional factor in adoption cases, how-
ever, is the presence of matching statutes in the adoption laws of some
states.24
Where the child in question has formed some sense of religious iden-
tity, matching statutes present the least trouble. Placement, where prac-
ticable, with parents who will continue to nurture this identity protects
the child's interests, whether defined as an interest in stability or an inter-
est in free exercise.2 45 Where the child has no such identity, the question
is more difficult. These cases can be divided into instances in which the
birth parents have indicated a desire that the child be raised in a particu-
lar religion and those in which they have not.
Where parents have indicated such a desire, respect for those wishes
can be seen as mere deference to parental choice, rather than the decision
of the state concerning the value of a particular religion. While it is un-
likely that the biological parents have a free exercise right to such state
deference, 246 as long as it is, in fact, deference to private preference
rather than imposition of a state decision, there is little threat of it being
perceived as an illegitimate endorsement of religion. At least one court
has found that in Lemon-based terms, permitting biological parents to
have some say in the adoption process may reduce the trauma of giving
up a child and encourage "the adoption of potentially disadvantaged
children."247 Such legitimate secular purposes and effects validate the
use of matching statutes in these cases.
Finally, what if the biological parent has expressed no preference, but
a statute is invoked to match the child with a family of the religious
background imputed to the child? Some commentators have concluded
that the practice of religious matching in these instances violates the es-
tablishment clause.248 The factors of deference to parental choice or pro-
motion of the welfare of the child are not present here, and their absence
243. See supra notes 216-223 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
245. Many matching statutes require matching "where practicable," which has al-
lowed the statutes to withstand establishment and free exercise clause challenges. See
supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
246. The first step in analysis of a free exercise claim is to question whether govern-
ment would substantially impair the claimant's religious practice unless the claim is rec-
ognized. See supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text. A parent giving a child up for
adoption would have to prove that the parent's own free exercise was substantially im-
paired by the fact that his or her child was being raised in another religion. See In re
Efrain C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 1027, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255, 264 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (parental
right to control child's religion depends upon continuing parental relationship).
247. Note, supra note 147, at 566 (discussing unpublished opinion, Easton v. Angus,
No. C084-1061W (D. Utah June 13, 1985).
248. See Ramsey, supra note 148, at 680-81; Comment, A Reconsideration of the Reli-
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supports the conclusion that religious matching schemes in which the
state chooses the child's religion is unconstitutional. One additional fac-
tor, however, must be considered before endorsing such a conclusion.
Where a child would have been raised within the traditions of a dis-
tinct minority religion, might religious matching serve the purpose of
preserving religious and cultural diversity?249 There is little constitu-
tional authority for the claim that the religious community has any sort
of free exercise right to retain "its" children.250 The secular effect sought
and obtained by government policies, however, need not limit the gov-
ernment to acts that they are compelled to take under constitutional du-
ress. If the state were to engage in religious matching of dominant
religious groups, in the absence of express preferences of the child or
biological parents, the perceived effect would be to entrench religious ma-
jorities. Such a practice would fail both the Lemon test and the non-
endorsement test. Were religious matching of children born into minor-
ity religious communities considered an absolute requirement, so that
otherwise beneficial adoption would not take place, the deference to the
continuation of religious diversity might be seen as undue endorsement
of religion. But where, as in the case of all states employing religious
matching, it does not override other clear "best interests" factors and
where it is employed only on behalf of religions whose minority status
makes it unlikely that state action to preserve them will be seen as en-
dorsement for their beliefs over those of any other group, religious
matching serves interests perfectly consistent with the secular values of
maintaining diversity in a liberal democratic society.
Arguments that religious matching statutes are unconstitutional as
lacking legitimate secular purposes and effects fail in several types of
cases. Where a child already has developed a religious identity, where
the biological parent has indicated a clear preference with respect to reli-
gion, or where the child comes from a distinct minority religious commu-
nity, use of religion as one factor does not pose a serious threat to
establishment clause values.251
CONCLUSION
Both the unreflective use of religion as a positive factor in custody
disputes and adoption proceedings and the contention that the establish-
ment clause precludes use of religious factors are unwarranted. Much of
gious Element in Adoption, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 780, 812-13 (1971); Note, supra note 147,
at 559-60.
249. For a discussion of the role of adoption in threatening minority cultures in an-
other context, see McCartney, The American Indian Child Welfare Crisis: Cultural Ge-
nocide or First Amendment Protection, 7 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 529, 551 (1975)("The separation of American Indian children from their families and the coerced assimi-
lation into the dominant society destroys the American Indian way of life and the culture
which is woven into that life.").
250. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 237-41 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
251. See supra notes 203-215 & 245-250 and accompanying text.
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the confusion in this area flows from inadequate, narrow views of what
religion is. If religion is defined as traditional theism, found almost inva-
riably in familiar denomination, much of the traditional deference to reli-
gion in the law of child custody does pose serious constitutional
problems.
But under a broader view, in which traditional theism is only one of
many expressions of religion, consideration of religion as a positive factor
violates neither the Lemon test, nor the principle of non-endorsement of
religion. Courts have been sensitive to two crucial principles: first, that
except in the most exceptional cases, comparative judgments between re-
ligions must be avoided; and second, that religion may only be one factor
of many in the analysis of the best interests of the child. With these two
,principles in place and with a proper conception of religion, religion may
constitutionally be used in child custody and adoption decisions.
